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AND ISRAEL/PALESTINE 
 
Hedi Viterbo* 
 
Taking analogy as both its mode and object of inquiry, this Article 
canvasses the relationship between historical-geographical analogies and 
generational segregation (the large-scale separation of children and adults) from 
three complementary perspectives. First, due to restrictions recently introduced 
by the Israeli authorities, Palestinian prisoners have been prevented from 
reading popular study materials dealing with both Indigenous child removal and 
analogies concerning settler-Indigenous relations in North America and 
Australia. Reviving the critical potential of this encounter with analogies and 
accounts, I put forward an analogy between the removal of Indigenous children 
to boarding schools in the United States and Canada, Australia’s Aboriginal 
“stolen generations”, and the increased separation of Palestinian children and 
adults themselves in Israeli custody. This analogy highlights key parallels: the 
deleterious effects of allegedly benevolent generational segregation; the 
invocation of law and children’s “best interests”; the severance of unwanted 
intergenerational influences; the targeting of children due to their presumed 
plasticity; the use of separation to govern adults; and links between generational 
segregation, “national security”, and incarceration.  
Second, these analogies – those Palestinians explored in Israeli prison 
and the generational segregation analogy developed here – partly overlap with, 
and acquire their potential and implications from other analogies, concerning 
settler-Indigenous relations in North America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine. I 
examine the roles such analogies have played, and their alignment with 
competing ideologies, across a range of legal and political discourses over the 
past two centuries.  
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Finally, in order to maximize the critical potential of such historical-
geographical analogies, I offer a conceptual critique of three relevant discourses: 
legalistic analogies concerning generational segregation, which leave 
unchallenged the broader field of child law and policy on which such 
segregation hinges; analogies between North America, Australia, and 
Israel/Palestine that rigidly conceptualize (settler) colonialism; and a tendency 
to reduce analogy to similarity. Bringing into conversation previously separate 
bodies of scholarship, these three interdependent perspectives shed new light on 
important yet hitherto unexamined issues at the intersection of analogy and 
generational segregation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last quarter of the 19th century, [… the U.S.] government reached the 
conclusion that successful assimilation required removing Indian children from 
their reservations and reeducating them away from their families and 
environments. […] For several years, Indian parents had to send their children to 
various off-reservation boarding schools […] or to specially constructed boarding 
schools at the periphery of the reservations. […] Once the children arrived at 
these schools, their teachers would force them to abandon their tribal customs 
and adopt white-American behaviors […]. Many children’s experience of the 
boarding school was traumatic [… and the] integrity of the Indian family – 
whose children had been removed – was severely compromised. 
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The forced removal of [Aboriginal] children from their families as part of their 
reeducation continued [in Australia …] even during the 20th century […]. The 
Australian government’s apology for these actions – even after the findings of an 
inquiry commission it itself had appointed in the 1990s – was weak and 
insufficient […].1 
 
 Taken from a coursebook of the Israeli Open University on the genocide2 of North 
America’s Indigenous peoples, these excerpts seem to lend themselves to analogy. Indeed, as 
described below, this academic coursebook systematically encourages its readers to think 
critically through analogies between different times and places.3 As the coursebook title broadly 
refers to “North America”, such analogy may encompass Canada, where a somewhat similar 
policy was pursued for over a century by placing an estimated 150,000 Indigenous children in so-
called Indian Residential Schools.4  
In the last two decades, both Canada and Australia have seen the publication of public 
inquiry reports on, and prime ministerial apologies for, this generational segregation5 of 
Indigenous people. There has also been court litigation on the matter in both countries, including 
a 2006 settlement agreement in Canada’s largest ever class action on behalf of living residential 
schools survivors, which led to a national Truth and Reconciliation Commission operating 
between the years 2008 and 2015.6 In the United States, then-President Obama signed the Native 
                                                 
1  ARNON GUTFELD, GENOCIDE IN THE “LAND OF THE FREE”: THE INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA 1776-
1890, at 19, 145-47 (2006) (Hebrew), available at 
http://olvreader.sefereshet.org.il/Olive/OTB/OpenU/?href=OU03/2008/01/02&usticket=Z3Vlc3Q&tic
ket=. 
2  The Genocide Convention lists “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” as a 
genocidal act if “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group”. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 
260A(III), 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), Art. II. This is mentioned in the above Open 
University textbook. GUTFELD, supra note 1, at 13. For extensive discussion of this definition of 
genocide, see GENOCIDE AND SETTLER SOCIETY: FRONTIER VIOLENCE AND STOLEN INDIGENOUS 
CHILDREN IN AUSTRALIAN HISTORY (A. Dirk Moses ed., 2004).  
3  See infra text accompanying footnotes 8-12.  
4  WARD CHURCHILL, KILL THE INDIAN, SAVE THE MAN: THE GENOCIDAL IMPACT OF AMERICAN INDIAN 
RESIDENTIAL SCHOOLS (2004); JAMES R. MILLER, SHINGWAUK’S VISION: A HISTORY OF NATIVE 
RESIDENTIAL SCHOOLS (1996); JOHN S. MILLOY, A NATIONAL CRIME: THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT 
AND THE RESIDENTIAL SCHOOL SYSTEM – 1879 TO 1986 (1999). 
5  On the reasons for using the phrase “generational segregation”, see infra text accompanying notes 
161-62. 
6  For critiques of these developments, see RECONCILING CANADA: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
CULTURE OF REDRESS (Jennifer Henderson & Pauline Wakeham eds., 2013); LESLIE THIELEN-
WILSON, WHITE TERROR, CANADA’S INDIAN RESIDENTIAL SCHOOLS AND THE COLONIAL PRESENT: 
FROM LAW TOWARDS A PEDAGOGY OF RECOGNITION (PhD thesis, Ontario Institute for Studies in 
Education, University of Toronto, 2012), available at 
https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/handle/1807/32328; Tony Barta, Sorry, and not sorry, in Australia: 
How the apology to the stolen generations buried a history of genocide, 10 J. GENOCIDE RES. 201 
(2008); Denise Cuthbert & Marian Quartly, Forced Child Removal and the Politics of National 
Apologies in Australia, 37 AM. INDIAN Q. 178 (2013); Cindy Holder, Reasoning Like a State: 
Integration and the Limits of Official Regret, in ON THE USES AND ABUSES OF POLITICAL APOLOGIES 
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American Apology Resolution into law in 2009, but the event was closed to the public and the 
laconic Resolution, unlike the bill, made no mention of child removal.7 
As shown below, in Part I of this Article, the above coursebook and the two subjects it 
addresses – generational segregation and analogies – have played a key role for Palestinians in 
Israeli prison. Until recently, this coursebook was immensely popular among these Palestinians, 
many of whom were enrolled in courses provided by the Israeli Open University. Through this 
and other study materials, they would engage with potentially critical historical-geographical 
analogies, thus traversing the prison walls, ideationally if not physically. Further, not only could 
these Palestinians read about faraway generational segregation in this coursebook, but they 
themselves have also been increasingly subjected to such segregation in Israeli prison, as a result 
of changes to the laws applied to them. The Israeli government, however, recently banned their 
enrollment in such academic courses, thus denying them access to this book – with its analysis of 
generational segregation and its analogy-oriented critique.  
Placing analogies, generational segregation, and their interrelation at its core, this Article 
poses three questions. The first is explored in Part I: what critical insights can historical-
geographical analogies offer, particularly regarding generational segregation? As if reviving 
Palestinian prisoners’ encounter with analogy-filled studies, I advance an analogy between the 
removal of Indigenous children to boarding schools in the United States and Canada, Australia’s 
Aboriginal “stolen generations”, and the separation of Palestinian children and adults in Israeli 
custody. Through this analogy, important but hitherto overlooked parallels are brought to light: 
the deleterious effects of allegedly benevolent generational segregation; the invocation of law and 
children’s “best interests”; the severance of unwanted intergenerational influences; the targeting 
of children due to their presumed plasticity; the use of separation to govern adults; and links 
between generational segregation, “national security”, and incarceration. 
Having employed analogy as its mode of inquiry, the Article then takes analogy as an 
object of inquiry – thereby, in a sense, critically reflecting on its own method. This includes 
tackling a second question, concerning analogy’s discursive functions: what role have analogies – 
particularly those involving settler-Indigenous dynamics, as in the above coursebook – played in 
legal and political discourses surrounding North America, Israel/Palestine, and Australia? To 
address this question, Part II of the Article analyzes a two-century long tapestry of analogies 
between these countries, discussing the various and often competing narratives and ideologies 
with which such analogies have aligned themselves. Among other things, this analysis provides a 
context through which to better understand Palestinian prisoners’ engagement with analogy-filled 
                                                                                                                                                 
203 (Mihaela Mihai & Mathias Thaler eds., 2014); Damien Short, When sorry isn’t good enough: 
Official remembrance and reconciliation in Australia, 5 MEMORY STUD. 293 (2012); Leslie Thielen-
Wilson, Troubling the Path to Decolonization: Indian Residential School Case Law, Genocide, and 
Settler Legitimacy, 29 CAN. J. L. & SOC’Y 181 (2014); Pauline Wakeham, Reconciling “Terror”: 
Managing Indigenous Resistance in the Age of Apology, 36 AM. INDIAN Q. 1 (2012). On the politics 
of official apologies for historical mass child abuse in out-of-home care generally, beyond the 
Indigenous child removal context, see APOLOGIES AND THE LEGACY OF ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN 
‘CARE’: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Johanna Sköld & Shurlee Swain eds., 2015). 
7  On these and other shortcomings, see Kevin Bruyeel, The American Liberal Colonial Tradition, 3 
SETTLER COLONIAL STUD. 311 (2013); Penny Edmonds, Afterword: On Recognition, Apology and the 
‘Hidden History of the Americas’, 1 SETTLER COLONIAL STUD. 182 (2011); Felicia S. Hodge, No 
Meaningful Apology for American Indian Unethical Research Abuses, 22 ETHICS & BEHAV. 431 
(2012). 
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studies, as well as Israeli authorities’ crackdown on these studies.  
Further inquiring into analogy, and in view of the multiple uses of analogies identified in 
Part II, a third and final question arises: what are the possible pitfalls of analogies, including the 
analogies Palestinian prisoners studied and the generational segregation analogy provided here? 
How, while opening up certain horizons for thought, do analogies exclude or obscure others? Part 
III considers this question, with a focus on three germane framings of analogies. The first is 
legalistic analogies, which portray the generational segregations in question as violations of, or 
deviations from, legal norms. This framing, I will show, ignores crucial connections and parallels 
these supposedly exceptional segregations share with the broader field of child law and policy. A 
second problematic framing – often appearing in analogies between North America, Australia, 
and Israel/Palestine – is rigid conceptualizations or demarcations of “(settler) colonialism”. This 
rigidity, I will argue, represents over-simplistic and reductive understandings of (settler) 
colonialism. Finally, a third and common framing of analogies is the tendency to reduce them to 
similarity. As I will explain, this conception overlooks analogy’s predication on difference; 
ignores analogy’s influence on whether its supposedly pre-existing referents are deemed alike in 
the first place; and risks making similarity a prerequisite for solidarity. 
The Conclusion brings together these three complementary readings. It discusses their 
innovative linking of previously separate bodies of scholarship, and reflects on their unique 
substantive and methodological implications for thinking about both analogy and generational 
segregation.  
 
I.  ANALOGY AND GENERATIONAL SEGREGATION 
 
A.  Transcending Prison through Analogies 
 
As touched upon above, the Israeli academic coursebook repeatedly fosters critical 
thinking through analogies (albeit without explicitly using the term “analogy”). It analogizes “the 
current approach of the United States toward its Indigenous population” to those of “other states 
[… including] Canada [… and] Australia”,8 and also encourages students to consider lessons 
from (and thus think through analogies about) U.S. history.9 The coursebook further counts the 
United States – which it calls a “settler state”10 – among the culprits for “‘colonial’ genocides” by 
“European settlers [… in] the Americas and Australia”, settlers who are said to have “supplanted, 
and directly or indirectly exterminated, America’s Indigenous people [… and] Australia’s 
Aborigines”.11 The term “colonial” reappears in another Open University coursebook,12 this time 
                                                 
8  GUTFELD, supra note 1, at 21. 
9  Id., at 8-9.  
10  Id., at 24. 
11  Id., at 18-19. 
12  Amal Jamal, Racialized Time and the Foundations of Colonial Rule in the Israeli-Palestinian Context, 
in GENOCIDE: BETWEEN RACISM AND GENOCIDE IN THE MODERN ERA 185 (Yair Auron & Isaac 
Lubelsky eds., 2011) (Hebrew), available at 
http://olvreader.sefereshet.org.il/Olive/OTB/OpenU/?href=OU03/2008/01/11&usticket=Z3Vlc3Q&tic
ket=. 
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in reference to Israel’s treatment of Palestinians, perhaps insinuating a cross-national 
commonality.  
Among the readers of these analogy-invoking coursebooks were, until recently, many of 
the Palestinians in Israeli custody whom Israeli authorities classify as “security prisoners” – an 
elastic statutory category applied almost exclusively to Palestinians, predominantly non-
citizens.13 From 1994, such prisoners could enroll in Israeli Open University courses in the social 
sciences and humanities, subject to the prison authorities’ discretion.14 With an average of around 
250 so-called “security prisoners” enrolled each year, mostly under the Palestinian Authority’s 
sponsorship, these academic courses became hugely popular.15 Most popular was a course on the 
topic of genocide,16 which includes the foregoing textbooks. As one of the course lecturers would 
later recount, “the Palestinian prisoners are particularly interested in [studying …] the 
annihilation of the Native Americans”.17 
In 2011, however, the Israeli government announced a prohibition on these prisoners’ 
enrollment in Open University courses18 – a decision upheld twice by the Israeli Supreme Court.19 
Being most popular among Palestinian prisoners, the course on genocide, filled with potentially 
loaded analogies, figured prominently in the ensuing legal and political debate. In his response to 
Palestinian prisoners’ petitions to lift the ban, the Israeli State Attorney conflated learning about 
                                                 
13  Adalah, Statistics on Detainees and Prisoners in Israeli prisons (2013), available at 
http://www.adalah.org/Public/files/English/Newsletter/103-April2013/PalestianPoliticalPrisoners-
Statistics-April-2013.pdf. 
14  This provision, made after a hunger strike by some Palestinian prisoners in 1992, was granted in 
Commission Ordinance 04.48.00: Sec. Prisoners’ Open University Stud. (Jan. 8, 2004; repealed June 
2011); it was repealed in 2011, as discussed below. Non-“security” prisoners, in contrast, have been 
allowed to study since as early as 1978. Petition in HCJ 204/13 Sallah v. Prison Service [2013].  
15  Petition in HCJ 204/13, supra; YANIV RONEN, SECURITY PRISONERS’ ACADEMIC STUDIES (Knesset 
Res. & Information Center, Nov. 28, 2013) (Hebrew), 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m03319.pdf. 
16  Eric Bender, The Most Popular Course Among Terrorists: Genocide, NRG (Dec. 5, 2013) (Hebrew), 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/528/384.html. 
17  Yehonatan Alsheh, Teaching Comparative Genocide Studies to Palestinian Prisoners in Israel, THE G 
WORD (July 8, 2011), available at http://genocidetalk.wordpress.com/2011/07/08/teaching-
comparative-genocide-studies-to-palestinian-prisoners-in-israel/. 
18  Though the Israeli government presented the ban, in 2011, as a means to pressure the Palestinian 
Hamas into releasing Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit from captivity in Gaza, the IPS had already barred 
“security prisoners” from taking around 30 Open University courses four years before Shalit’s 
capture; access to these courses was resumed, at the time, only following the Palestinian prisoners’ 
petition on the matter. Petition (Naz) 761/02 John Doe v. Israel Prison Service (Nov. 7, 2002), 
available at http://www.acri.org.il/pdf/petitions/hit761.pdf; see also Ass’n for Civil Rts. in Israel, 
Security Prisoners Barred from Taking Certain Courses (Nov. 7, 2002) (Hebrew), available at 
http://www.acri.org.il/he/529. Additionally, the prison authorities had already introduced the blanket 
ban on Open University studies in 2010, a year before the government publicly announced it and 
linked it to Shalit’s release. Avi Issacharoff & Amos Harel, Palestinian prisoners: Netanyahu’s 
crackdown is old news, HAARETZ (June 28, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/print-
edition/news/palestinian-prisoners-netanyahu-s-crackdown-is-old-news-1.369940. Despite Shalit’s 
release in 2011 in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, the prohibition on Open University studies 
remains in place. 
19  CA 2459/12 Sallah v. Prison Service [2012]; HCJ 204/13 Sallah v. Prison Service [2015]. 
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genocide with genocidal inclinations, by pointing to the popularity of this course as evidence, 
supposedly, of the prisoners’ fanaticism.20 Protesting against these “unseemly and outrageous” 
allegations, the president of the Open University remarked that the course actually “conveys a 
universal and moral message” and aims to “give students knowledge about the issue of genocide 
and the ability to analyze it as a historical phenomenon”.21 Yet, this criticism did not prevent the 
chair of the Israeli parliamentary Interior and Environmental Affairs Committee, who would later 
become a minister, from making similar claims: 
 
[The …] prisoners’ main studies are genocide studies – this is unbelievable […. 
They] learn how to continue acting against the State of Israel. […] The mentality 
of a prisoner studying genocide is clear. [… They] studied genocide […] in order 
to perfect their ideas and capabilities toward their possible release from prison. 
[…] If they wish to rehabilitate themselves, they should study something else, 
not genocide.22 
 
This academic course on genocide, in fact, is not the only platform Palestinian prisoners 
have cultivated for potentially critical historical-geographical analogies. Nor is it the only such 
platform curtailed by the Israeli authorities. The prisoners’ self-organized study groups have 
reportedly placed emphasis on examining parallels and differences between military and colonial 
regimes, as well as on studying the political experience of liberation movements outside 
Israel/Palestine.23 The Israeli prison authorities, on their part, have clamped down on this 
analogy-oriented avenue as well, placing the prisoners’ study activities under increasing 
restrictions.24 
Without idealizing the emancipatory power of education, Palestinians’ encounter with 
these analogies in Israeli prison seems to exemplify what anthropologist Esmail Nashif has 
described as these prisoners’ “revolutionary pedagogy”: their use of “reading/writing [as a …] 
praxis of resistance […], not just in and by itself but, more importantly, as part of the community-
building process […], as a space between captives that transcended the space of the prisons”.25 
The power of such textual engagements to ideationally traverse the prison’s confines becomes all 
the more pronounced when analogies such as the above are involved, analogies that further urge 
Palestinian prisoners to think across and in relation to times and places different from their own. 
By hindering Palestinian inmates’ ability to imagine past the prison walls, Israel’s repression of 
                                                 
20  Quoted in Ofir Mintz-Manor, Genocide, Year 1, HAARETZ (Jan. 3, 2013) (Hebrew), 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/1.1899899. 
21  Talila Nesher & Jackie Khoury, Open University Lecturers versus the Supreme Court: Grant Studies 
to Security Prisoners, HAARETZ (Jan. 9, 2013) (Hebrew), 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/1.1903654. 
22  Interior & Environmental Affairs Committee, 19th Knesset – Transcript 160 (Dec. 23, 2013) 
(Hebrew), available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/data/rtf/pnim/2013-12-23.rtf. 
23  MAYA ROSENFELD, CONFRONTING THE OCCUPATION: WORK, EDUCATION, AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM 
OF PALESTINIAN FAMILIES IN A REFUGEE CAMP (2004); see also JOHN COLLINS, OCCUPIED BY 
MEMORY: THE INTIFADA GENERATION AND THE PALESTINIAN STATE OF EMERGENCY (2004). 
24  Commission Ordinance 03.02.00: Guidelines Regarding Sec. Prisoners (15 Mar. 2002; last amended 
10 July 2014), Art. 21. 
25  ESMAIL NASHIF, PALESTINIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS: IDENTITY AND COMMUNITY 73-74 (2008). 
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such studies and analogies operates as mental incarceration of sorts, and thus as an additional 
form of punishment, even if not formally presented as such.  
 
B.  Generational Segregation in Israeli Custody 
 
In addition to losing access to the coursebook that broaches the subject of generational 
segregation in North America and Australia, Palestinians in Israeli custody have themselves 
recently undergone increased generational segregation. In the spirit of the analogy-filled study 
materials these prisoners are prevented from reading, the question arises of whether their 
generational segregation can in any sense be considered analogous to that of Indigenous people in 
North America or Australia. In order to tackle this question, some background information is 
necessary. 
In the past, Israel held all Palestinian child prisoners, as well as child detainees aged 
sixteen and over, with Palestinian adults. Inadvertently, this enabled Palestinian inmates to 
systematically transfer what they regarded as valuable political knowledge from one generation to 
another, primarily through their self-organized study activities, leading many Palestinians to view 
Israeli prison as an “academy of political activism” for young inmates.26 Like the historical-
geographical analogies with which they engaged, this intergenerational knowledge transfer held 
the potential for inmates to transcend their confinement: for ideationally reconnecting them with 
the Palestinian society from which they had been removed, while also tying their past (their pre-
prison lives) to the national future they were devising. None of this escaped the Israeli prison 
authorities, who described prison, in their journal, as “the national Palestinian academy”, adding: 
“For [these] prisoners […, Israeli] prison is a stage in […] national development, personally and 
collectively. [… They] have delved into Israeli issues, mainly by reading books, [… and] have 
had ideological debates on […] the future character of the Palestinian state.”27 
But over the past fifteen years – a period in which Israel is estimated to have detained 
between 8,50028 and 12,00029 non-citizen Palestinian children30 – all of this changed dramatically, 
as a series of legal changes have nearly eliminated joint incarceration.31 Further, in 2009, Israel 
                                                 
26  ROSENFELD, supra note 23, at 238-65; COLLINS, supra note 23, at 125-30; Lisa Taraki, The 
development of political consciousness among Palestinians in the occupied territories, 1967-1987, in 
INTIFADA: PALESTINE AT THE CROSSROADS 53, 68 (Jamal R. Nassar & Roger Heacock eds., 1990). 
27  Ronny Shaked, Security Prisoners in Israeli Prisons. 23 SEEING SHABAS – J. THE IPS 26, 27 (2008) 
(Hebrew), available at http://ips.gov.il/Items/04423/23.pdf. 
28  Defence for Child. Int’l – Palestine et al., Israel’s Compliance with the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights – Shadow Report to the Fourth Periodic Report of Israel, 112th Session of 
the Human Rights Committee (Oct. 2014), available at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/ISR/INT_CCPR_CSS_ISR_18219_
E.docx. 
29  Addameer, Imprisonment of Children (Feb. 2016), available at 
http://www.addameer.org/the_prisoners/children. 
30  These figures do not include East Jerusalem, where nearly 800 Palestinian children are estimated to 
have been detained in the year 2016 alone. Addameer, Joint report estimates that 6440 Palestinians 
arrested in 2016 (Jan. 2, 2017), available at http://www.addameer.org/news/joint-report-estimates-
6440-palestinians-arrested-2016. 
31  Joint incarceration remains legally permissible in certain circumstances. In addition, at their request, 
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also established so-called “military youth courts”, which try Palestinian children separately from 
their adult counterparts,32 though there has been no discernible change to either sentencing 
guidelines for these children or the actual sentences imposed.33 In the early stages of this shift, the 
Israeli judiciary advocated separation as a means to sever intergenerational Palestinian influence: 
in 2003, for example, the Military Court of Appeals cautioned against the exposure of a 12-year-
old Palestinian convict “to [… older] prisoners’ ideologies” and therefore ordered his removal 
from those Palestinian “adults who wished to capture his soul”,34 an image strikingly reminiscent 
of nineteenth-century child rescue discourse.  
I have recently examined the increased generational segregation of Palestinians in Israeli 
custody in depth elsewhere,35 and will therefore only touch upon its most relevant implications. 
Crucially, the Palestinian adults in question are not “criminals” in the common sense of the word, 
are incarcerated separately from those thus classified, and often self-identify, instead, as “political 
prisoners”. Further, contrary to the Israeli courts’ remarks cited above, various sources, including 
testimonies of Palestinian child ex-detainees, suggest that when they were still jointly 
incarcerated, adult Palestinian inmates provided their juniors with valuable psychological, 
material, and educational support, in addition to representing their concerns to the Israeli 
authorities. Moreover, separation from these adult inmates has left Palestinian children less 
protected against the abuse they are frequently alleged to suffer at the hands of the Israeli prison 
and security staff.36  
Formally, these Palestinian children are removed not from their parents but from the 
older inmates – a major difference, ostensibly, to Indigenous child removal in Australia and 
North America. But in practice, many of these Palestinian children are also denied contact with 
their parents, usually either on “security” grounds or as a result of being transferred to facilities 
inside Israel, out of their families’ reach.37 Like the growing restriction of Palestinians’ studies in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Palestinian prisoners are currently allowed to elect a few adults to oversee child inmates during the 
day (while still being held separately at night). This limited intergenerational contact has been 
reported to have both beneficial and harmful consequences for Palestinian children: on the one hand, 
these adults provide them with valuable assistance and support; on the other hand, Israeli authorities 
have attempted to trick child suspects into confessing by detaining them with adult Palestinian 
informants who pose as these elected supervisors. Hedi Viterbo, Rights as a Divide-and-Rule 
Mechanism: Lessons from the Case of Palestinians in Israeli Custody, L. & SOC. INQUIRY 
(forthcoming). Israel’s use of informants is further discussed infra text accompanying note 221.  
32  Israeli military courts try thousands of Palestinians from the West Bank every year and assume 
jurisdiction even over territories formally under the Palestinian Authority’s control. Sharon Weill, The 
Judicial Arm of the Occupation: The Israeli Military Courts in the Occupied Territories, 89 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 395 (2007).  
33  Viterbo forthcoming, supra note 31. 
34  MilA 358/03 E-Nasirat v. Military Prosecutor [2003]. 
35  Viterbo forthcoming, supra note 31. 
36  Id.; Philip Veerman & Adir Waldman, When can children and adolescents be detained separately 
from adults?: The case of Palestinian children deprived of their liberty in Israeli Military jails and 
prisons, 4 INT’L J. CHILD.’S RTS. 147 (1996). 
37  See, e.g., B’TSELEM, NO MINOR MATTER: VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF PALESTINIAN MINORS 
ARRESTED BY ISRAEL ON SUSPICION OF STONE-THROWING (2011), available at 
http://www.btselem.org/download/201107_no_minor_matter_eng.pdf; DEFENCE FOR CHILD. INT’L – 
PALESTINE, NO WAY TO TREAT A CHILD: PALESTINIAN CHILDREN IN THE ISRAELI MILITARY 
DETENTION SYSTEM (2016). 
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Israeli prison, the frequent denial of parental contact operates as a form of psychological 
incarceration and thus as extra punishment, even if not presented as such. For those children who 
are denied contact with their parents, adult Palestinian prisoners might be the closest available 
substitute for parental care38 – as a child formerly detained with adults indeed intimated: “The 
[adult] detainees treated us [children] well. […] I felt comfortable. […] At first, I was afraid and 
cried sometimes, because my family was far away. […] The adult detainees took care of me”.39 
Following the growing generational segregation, the Israeli Supreme Court has been 
relentlessly pressing for the prison authorities to exert counter-influence on Palestinian children 
in Israeli custody – or, in the court’s words, erect a “counter-barrier” of “rehabilitation”, 
“education and treatment”.40 No longer was it enough to terminate potentially politicizing 
practices such as studies and intergenerational interactions in prison; active depoliticization, 
formulated as “rehabilitation” at Israeli hands, became the new frontier. Yet, from the standpoint 
of many Palestinians, children who violate Israeli military law, such as stone throwers and 
demonstrators, are not juvenile delinquents in need of rehabilitation – all the more so when their 
so-called “rehabilitation” is placed in the hands of Israeli authorities, whose commitment to 
Palestinian interests is questionable. Further, in practice, most of the Israeli rulings extolling 
“rehabilitation” have neither avoided nor reduced Palestinian children’s prison sentences.41 
Unlike the generational segregation, the judicial preoccupation with “rehabilitation” has yet to be 
translated into substantial changes in actual incarceration or trial arrangements – a matter the 
Israeli Supreme Court has censured on several occasions.42  
 
C.  Analogizing Generational Segregation 
 
As described thus far, Palestinian prisoners, while undergoing growing generational 
segregation, have also been denied access to the study materials that discuss Indigenous child 
removal and call for thinking through historical-geographical analogies. A “what if” question thus 
arises: what if these Palestinians could continue encountering these analogies and information? 
What insights and parallels, specifically, could such analogies offer in relation to generational 
segregation, given the treatment of this issue in the above coursebook?  
A possible starting point for exploring such parallels is the detrimental effects of 
generational segregation. These include, among other things, exposing the separated children to 
either adult or peer abuse. Rather than separating children from adults outright, generational 
segregation has resulted in their placement with other – potentially abusive – adults: be they 
                                                                                                                                                 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/dcipalestine/pages/1527/attachments/original/1460665378/DC
IP_NWTTAC_Report_Final_April_2016.pdf. 
38  DEFENCE FOR CHILD. INT’L – PALESTINE, supra. 
39  B’Tselem, Testimony: 12-year-old beaten and imprisoned with adults, Sept. ’08 (Sept. 11, 2008), 
available at 
http://www.btselem.org/english/testimonies/20080911_muhammad_khawajah_age_12_detained_by_i
df.asp. 
40  CA 7515/08 State of Israel v. Gurin [2009]. 
41  Viterbo forthcoming, supra note 31. 
42  See, e.g., CA 7515/08, supra note 40; CrimA 3702/14 John Doe v. State of Israel [2014]; CrimA 
8639/13 Taritari v. State of Israel [2014]. 
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Israeli state agents43 or, in North America and Australia, boarding school staff.44 In addition, in 
North America and Australia alike, generational segregation, while fostering a strong peer 
culture,45 also exposed some Indigenous children to peer abuse in boarding schools.46 Interviews 
with Palestinian former child prisoners likewise suggest that Palestinian children might now be 
more likely to fight each other, without adult Palestinian inmates around to peacefully mediate 
their disputes.47 Moreover, Palestinian child inmates might experience separation from older 
prisoners as extra punishment, as most come from poor families in which children and adults 
sleep in the same room48 – a possible parallel to the relative age heterogeneity of Indigenous 
communities in North America and Australia prior to their generational segregation.49 None of 
this suggests, however, that the experience of generational segregation is inevitably or entirely 
negative for each and every child concerned. The boarding school systems, for instance, had 
some unintended consequences that Indigenous children and communities may characterize as 
positive. Yet, these positive effects, if they were indeed that, do not diminish the harms of 
generational segregation.50  
Furthermore, across time and space, generational segregation has largely been couched in 
a language of legalism and benevolence. Israeli authorities have portrayed it as being both 
consistent with international law and in Palestinian children’s “best interests”.51 Law, 
benevolence, rights, and humanism were similarly invoked to advocate the removal, re-education, 
and placing out of Indigenous children in North America and Australia, and statutory authorities 
were developed and expanded to increasingly facilitate these measures.52 In the late nineteenth-
                                                 
43  See supra note 36. 
44  DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BOARDING 
SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, 1875-1928 (1995); CHURCHILL, supra note 4; MARGARET D. JACOBS, WHITE 
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AND NEW ZEALAND (1995); JACOBS, supra note 44; WOOLFORD, supra note 44, at 206; Jacobs, supra 
note 44. 
47  Veerman & Waldman, supra note 36. 
48  Id.; Viterbo forthcoming, supra note 31. 
49  JACOBS, supra note 44, at 240-42; Jacobs, supra note 44, at 208-09. 
50  Victoria Haskins & Margaret D. Jacobs, Stolen Generations and Vanishing Indians: The Removal of 
Indigenous Children as a Weapon of War in the United States and Australia, 1870-1940, in CHILDREN 
AND WAR: A HISTORICAL ANTHOLOGY 227 (James Marten ed., 2002). 
51  See, e.g., Military Courts Unit, The Military Courts Unit (Judea and Samaria), (Apr. 2013), available 
at 
http://www.militarycourtwatch.org/files/server/IDF%20Military%20Court%20Briefing%20Paper.pdf. 
52  ADAMS, supra note 44; CHURCHILL, supra note 4; JACOBS, supra note 44; Jacobs, supra note 44, at 
112-14; Manne, supra note 44, at 220-21, 235; Claire Palmiste, Forcible removals: The case of 
Australian Aboriginal and Native American children, 4 ALTERNATIVE 75 (2008); Shurlee Swain, But 
the Children... Indigenous Child Removal Policies Compared, in WRITING COLONIAL HISTORIES: 
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century United States, placement in off-reservation boarding schools was portrayed as “rescuing 
[… Indigenous] children and youth” “from the awful doom that hangs over them”, and as 
granting them “an opportunity for the development of [… their] better nature” by turning them 
into “honorable, useful, happy citizens of a great republic”. “Without it”, it was claimed, they 
were “doomed either to destruction or to hopeless degradation”. Legislation at the time 
accordingly spoke of the need to “ensure the attendance of Indian children […] at schools 
established […] for their benefit”.53 Over several decades from the 1880s, Australian officials 
likewise asserted that “half-caste” children “need protection and control, otherwise they become a 
menace to the white race”. Generational segregation was hence presented as rescuing Australia’s 
Indigenous children “from danger to themselves, and from being a danger to the whole of the 
white population”, and also as turning them into “decent and useful members of the community”, 
whereas non-separation was described as, “to say the least, cruel”.54  
To turn children into productive members of society in line with dominant ideologies and 
interests, a more specific common rationale, in varying iterations, has been that separation would 
sever allegedly harmful intergenerational ties. While presenting rehabilitation at Israeli hands as 
likely to bring Palestinian children “to function in accordance with norms and productively” and 
hence as being “in the public interest”,55 Israeli courts recurrently warned that intergenerational 
Palestinian interactions in prison would undermine such rehabilitation.56 Child removal on both 
sides of the Pacific was also largely targeted against unwanted intergenerational knowledge 
transfer, and aimed to break Indigenous children’s habits and thereby make them “useful” to 
white society.57 In the 1860s, U.S. officials voiced concerns over Indigenous adults’ “deleterious 
influences” over their youngsters, resulting in the “infection” of the latter with “the filthy habits 
and loose morals of their parents”.58 A Canadian federal report likewise declared, in 1880: “The 
Indian youth, to enable him to cope successfully with […] white [society …], must be dissociated 
from the prejudicial influences by which he is surrounded”.59 Similarly, in the 1880s and 1890s, 
Canadian exponents of Indigenous child removal cautioned against leaving Indigenous children 
                                                                                                                                                 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 133 (Tracey Banivanua Mar & Julie Evans eds., 2002); Shurlee Swain, 
Enshrined in Law: Legislative Justifications for the Removal of Indigenous and Non-Indigenous 
Children in Colonial and Post-Colonial Australia, 47 AUSTL. HIST. STUD. 191, 196-207 (2016); 
Robert Van Krieken, The ‘Stolen Generations’ and Cultural Genocide: The forced removal of 
Australian Indigenous children from their families and its implications for the sociology of childhood, 
6 CHILDHOOD 297, 304-05 (1999). 
53  Quoted in CHURCHILL, supra note 4, at 16. 
54  JACOBS, supra note 44, at 41, 72; Haskins & Jacobs, supra note 50, at 229, 231. Aside from sharing 
such similar justifications, generational segregation has also rested on a similar legal architecture: 
formally granting certain entitlements to the separated population, but effectively denying these 
entitlements through various statutory loopholes. Regarding Palestinians and Native Americans, see, 
respectively, Viterbo forthcoming, supra note 31; JACOBS, supra note 44, at 166-67. Regarding the 
latter, see also ADAMS, supra note 44, at 65. 
55  CrimA 10118/06 John Doe v. State of Israel [2007]. 
56  See, e.g., Mil (Judea) 1261/09 Military Advocate General v. El-Farukh [2009]; Mil (Judea) 4779/08 
Military Advocate General v. Makhlouf [2009]. 
57  CHURCHILL, supra note 4; JACOBS, supra note 44; MILLOY, supra note 4; WOOLFORD, supra note 44; 
Jacobs, supra note 44; Manne, supra note 44. 
58  Quoted in CHURCHILL, supra note 4, at 21. 
59  Quoted in Swain 2002, supra note 52, at 139. 
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“under the guardianship of degraded parents”,60 who were seen as setting a “terrible example” for 
their children and thereby destining them to become “as depraved as themselves notwithstanding 
all the instructions given them at a day school”.61 “It is infinitely better”, one Australian state 
official claimed in a similar vein in 1937, “to take a child from its mother, and put it in an 
institution, […] than to allow it to be brought up subject to the [Aboriginal] influence”.62 Neither 
re-education nor separation alone was thus seen as sufficient: on the one hand, unless children 
were rigidly distanced from their elders, exposure to intergenerational influence would have 
undermined their re-education; on the other hand, without re-education, unwelcome habits and 
customs could not be properly replaced with knowledge acceptable to the dominant white 
culture.63 
Underpinning this rationale has been the targeting of children due to their presumed 
plasticity, being children, contrasted with the supposed irredeemability of their elders. The Israeli 
Supreme Court has emphatically espoused the “treatment of security prisoners who are minors or 
young adults”,64 “whose rehabilitation chances are better” than those of their older counterparts.65 
“Where [‘security prisoners’ who are] minors are concerned, an educational effort is needed”, the 
Supreme Court recently further remarked, adding that even with a “young adult there may be 
room for hope”.66 In a rather analogous manner, as early as the 1820s and 1830s, Canadian 
administrators declared that Indigenous “[c]hildren – the rising Generation, hold out a field for 
exertion”,67 and that since “little perhaps can be expected from the grown up Indians, [… 
successful civilization] will chiefly depend upon […] influence […] over the young”.68 Later 
proponents of generational segregation for Canada’s Indigenous children continued placing their 
hopes in “the plastic young nature”.69  
These children, it was believed, needed to be “caught young to be saved from […] the 
degenerating influence of their home environment”,70 which meant that “it is to the young that we 
must look for the complete change of condition”.71 Indigenous adults, in contrast, were generally 
referred to as the “old unimprovable people” and deemed “physically, mentally and morally […] 
unfitted to bear such a complete metamorphosis”.72 A prominent Canadian official maintained, in 
the late 1870s, that “[i]f anything is to be done with the Indian we must catch him very young”,73 
                                                 
60  Quoted in SHURLEE SWAIN & MARGOT HILLEL, CHILD, NATION, RACE AND EMPIRE: CHILD RESCUE 
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61  Quoted in MILLOY, supra note 4, at 26. 
62  JACOBS, supra note 44, at 43-44. 
63  ADAMS, supra note 44; ARMITAGE, supra note 46; JACOBS, supra note 44; MILLOY, supra note 4; 
Clifford E. Trafzer, Jean A. Keller & Lorene Sisquoc, Introduction: Origin and Development of the 
American Indian Boarding School System, in BOARDING SCHOOL BLUES, supra note 44, at 1; 
WOOLFORD, supra note 44; Swain 2002, supra note 52. 
64  CrimA 8639/13, supra note 42. 
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66  CA 3572/16 John Doe v. State of Israel [2017]. 
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colonial constructions of Aboriginal children and the geographies of Indian residential schooling in 
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adding that U.S. authorities, too, “have not much hope in regard to adult Indians, but sanguine 
anticipations are cherished respecting the children”.74 Officials in the United States indeed opined 
that the “main hope lies with the youthful generations who are still measurably plastic”, whereas 
“little can be hoped from them after growth”. “It is a mere waste of time to attempt to teach the 
average adult Indian the ways of the white man”, one official declared in 1879, and another 
emphasized seven years later: “It is rather the little children that must be taken in hand”.75 South 
Australia’s Protector of Aborigines argued in 1909, somewhat similarly, that “the children of 
half-castes are as a rule much lighter than their parents, and no doubt the process will continue 
until the blacks will altogether disappear”.76 
Though ostensibly child-focused, generational segregation targets adults as much as 
children. It aims to sever adults’ bonds with their future, a future embodied in the separated 
children, and consequently shatters the Indigenous or ethnic minority collective. It is additionally 
concerned with the dominant group’s adults, for whom it endeavors to create a new future. And 
beyond all of these functions, generational segregation has also served to govern adults no less 
than their separated juniors. For Israeli authorities, the presumed incorrigibility of the now-
segregated Palestinian adult inmates has furnished justification for eroding their rights, such as 
Open University studies. A core argument of Palestinian prisoners’ petitions on the matter was 
that these studies aided their rehabilitation,77 a claim reiterated by Open University lecturers who 
joined the litigation as amicus curiae.78 One lecturer added elsewhere that the University’s 
“comparative genocide studies” placed the Jewish Holocaust “within a comparative context and 
as part of the general phenomenon of genocide”, resulting in this historical event “no longer 
[being] dismissed by Palestinians as Zionist propaganda”.79 But the Israel Prison Service 
responded that these prisoners could not be meaningfully rehabilitated,80 and, as mentioned 
above, the petitions were subsequently rejected. Since their increased separation, these adults 
have also been denied other entitlements, including visits, primarily for pre-charge adult 
detainees, and receiving books from outside.81  
With Indigenous adults in nineteenth-century North America, a key function of 
generational segregation was as a counterinsurgency measure.82 During his tenure overseeing 
Indigenous prisoners, while dealing with their requests to reunite with their children and women, 
Richard Henry Pratt – a key figure in the history of Indigenous child removal and re-education – 
                                                                                                                                                 
British Columbia, Canada, 7 CHILD.’S GEOGRAPHIES 123, 129 (2009). 
74  Quoted in HELEN MAY, BALJIT KAUR & LARRY PROCHNER, EMPIRE, EDUCATION, AND INDIGENOUS 
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Robinson & Jessica Paten, The question of genocide and Indigenous child removal: the colonial 
Australian context, 10 J. GENOCIDE RES. 501, 502, 505-07 (2008). 
77  Petition in CA (NZ) 16209-09-11 Sultany v. Prison Service [2011]. 
78  HCJ 204/13, supra note 19. 
79  Alsheh, supra note 17. 
80  CA 2459/12, supra note 19. 
81  Viterbo forthcoming, supra note 31. 
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realized that generational segregation could serve to pacify Indigenous adults.83 At a time when 
education had already become an integral part of an aggressive policy of pacification,84 others in 
the United States came to share Pratt’s view. One government official wrote to Pratt that “placing 
Indian children in school” would make their “parents […] much easier managed […] and never 
dare, or desire, to commit a serious wrong”; another official specifically ordered him to obtain 
children from two hostile reservations to be used as “hostages for tribal good behavior”.85 Across 
the border, Canadian Prime Minister John MacDonald’s interest in re-educating Indigenous 
children was similarly inspired, in the 1870s, by his concern over Indigenous unrest.86 Canadian 
state officials and clergymen expressly spoke of residential schools as imperative for preventing 
Indigenous “rebellion” and enabling the peaceful occupation of the west. A key figure in 
Canada’s Department of Indian Affairs thus opined, in 1886: “It is unlikely that any Tribe or 
tribes would give trouble of a serious nature to the Government whose members had children 
completely under Government control”.87 Similar arguments – supporting child removal as a 
necessary means to break Indigenous resistance – were also made in Australia in the 1850s and 
1860s.88 
This is but part of a broader, common interrelation – by no means exclusive to 
Israel/Palestine (where the children in question are classified as “security offenders”) – between 
generational segregation, incarceration, and “national security”. The Open University coursebook 
Palestinian prisoners are no longer allowed to read aptly describes Pratt as a “military officer with 
great experience in fighting Indians”.89 Indeed, it was while experimenting in “rehabilitating” 
Indigenous prisoners of war through re-education, work, and military discipline that Pratt, the war 
veteran, developed his ideas about reforming Indigenous children. Pratt’s fusion of the 
“Battlefield and Classroom” (to borrow the title of his autobiography) continued when he later 
established the first, and highly influential, government-supported off-reservation Indian 
Boarding School at an unused military base donated by the U.S. War Department.90 Following 
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suit, a number of other schools were established in military barracks, and even schools not thus 
placed were nevertheless patterned after military compounds.91 There were initially dozens of 
children among the Indigenous prisoners, but most of them were eventually separated from the 
rest and placed in boarding schools, despite the recognition, on the prison authorities’ part, that 
such “separation […] is what [these prisoners …] constantly dread”.92  
Due to their military-like drills and order, along with other reasons, many child inmates 
analogized boarding schools such as Pratt’s to prisons, an analogy reiterated by numerous 
contemporaneous writers.93 Some Australian Indigenous children, too, depicted the institutions to 
which they were removed in similar terms.94 For Native American children, prison was more than 
a metaphor, since a standard form of punishment was to actually place them in a school “jail”.95 
One U.S. state official also linked education, criminality, and armed conflict, differently, when 
warning in 1896 that Indigenous children, if left in their communities, would “listen only to 
stories of war, rapine, bloodshed” and consequently become “a perpetual menace to our western 
civilization […] that will […] threaten [national] peace”.96  
Against this backdrop, it becomes clear that the two institutional sites of generational 
segregation – incarceration (for Palestinian “security prisoners”) and schools (for Indigenous 
people in North America and Australia) – have more in common than might first meet the eye.97 
Further, the continued hyper-incarceration of Indigenous children98 can be seen both as a legacy 
of Indigenous child removal and as its continuation by other means. Indeed, formulating this 
observation as an analogy, one Canadian defense attorney has described prison as “a ‘school’ for 
those [many Indigenous children] compelled to attend”, and criticized its “astonishing” parallels 
with Indian Residential Schools – both being instruments of mass removal, cultural assimilation 
(through restrictions on Indigenous practices), and rampant abuse.99 
Indeed, a growing number of scholars have shown how, far from being a matter of the 
past, the experiences, effects, and policies of Indigenous child removal intersect with, and inform, 
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contemporary discourses and practices in North America and Australia. These legacies of 
Indigenous child removal, it has been shown, appear in the criminal justice system – as evidenced 
by hyper-incarceration100 and other issues101 – as well as in the child welfare system102 and other 
areas of law and policy.103 Expanding and adding layers to this critical conversation, the 
generational segregation analogy provided here highlights how Indigenous child removal has 
transcended not only the times but also the countries of its occurrence – how it has transmigrated 
and, in a sense, re-emerged in the form of analogous practices elsewhere, beyond North America 
and Australia, such as the generational segregation of Palestinians in Israeli custody. Moreover, 
this recent development in Israel/Palestine has not received the scrutiny it deserves, possibly due 
to its invocation of taken-for-granted social and legal norms – which I will bring into question 
below – about childhood and children’s “best interests”. Analogizing the Israel-Palestinian 
context to Indigenous child removal therefore helps problematize a contemporary development 
that has hitherto largely escaped critical notice. 
 
II.  ALREADY ANALOGIZED 
 
Three engagements with analogies, some more direct than others, emerge thus far: first, 
Palestinians’ encounters with analogies in prison, including analogies concerning settler-
Indigenous conflicts and specifically Indigenous child removal in North America and Australia; 
second, Israeli authorities’ crackdown on the studies that brought together these prisoners and 
analogies; and finally, my own attempt to revive and explore, through the generational 
segregation analogy, the critical potential of Palestinian prisoners’ interaction with analogies.  
None of these, however, have taken place in a social or historical vacuum. Their 
surrounding legal and political discourses are rife with analogies, tying contemporary 
Israel/Palestine to other times and places, including those discussed above. A few years after the 
U.S. involvement in the Gulf War, for example, Uri Shoham, currently an Israeli Supreme Court 
Justice and at the time Israel’s Military Advocate General, published an article in the U.S. journal 
Military Law Review, opening with the following hypothetical analog to Israel’s rule over the 
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ontologies of child welfare in British Columbia, 21 CULTURAL GEOGRAPHIES 59 (2014); Heather 
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Palestinian territory: 
 
[I]magine the United States being in control of an area of land a quarter its own 
size, located just scant miles away from major United States cities, and populated 
by no less than 120 million Iraqis. With a few minor adjustments, these are the 
circumstances Israel has had to face since [assuming control over the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip in] 1967.104 
 
More recently, to garner international support for its 2014 offensive on the Gaza Strip, the Israeli 
military drew a similar hypothetical analogy: an image it disseminated online, with the headline 
“What would you do?”, showed rockets heading toward the Statue of Liberty in New York.105 
Israel’s Supreme Court has likewise drawn analogies between Israeli and U.S. 
counterinsurgency laws as grounds, among others, for denying petitions against the detention of 
Palestinians without trial.106 Over in the United States, in 2005, a CIA attorney, seeking to garner 
legislative support for continued use of controversial interrogation methods, analogized the public 
debate on the matter to the situation in Israel, where the Supreme Court had “ruled that several 
[… interrogation] techniques were possibly permissible, but require […] legislative sanction” and 
the government “ultimately got limited legislative authority for […] specific techniques”.107 
 Analogies thus align themselves with both state and counter-state ideologies, thereby 
lending themselves to different and even competing uses in different hands. That any given 
analogy can be imbued with such multiple effects calls for a more nuanced understanding of how 
analogies – such as the above generational segregation analogy – operate, or can operate. Before 
theorizing this issue more broadly in Part III, I will now analyze its concrete manifestations in 
one particularly relevant type of analogy, which also appears, as I have mentioned, in the 
academic coursebooks to which Israeli authorities have denied Palestinians access: that 
concerning settler-Indigenous relations in North America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine.  
Outside the coursebooks now out of Palestinian prisoners’ reach, such analogies have 
figured centrally in contemporary cross-national solidarity activities, among other sites. This 
global solidarity project serves as a context within which to place, and through which to better 
understand, the implications of the analogies at the heart of this Article – among other reasons 
because Palestinian prisoners themselves have studied the experiences of anticolonial and 
liberation movements elsewhere, as mentioned above.108 In a recent statement in support of 
Indigenous sovereignty and rights in Canada, a Palestinian group thus pointed to “deep 
                                                 
104  Uri Shoham, The Principle of Legality and the Israeli Military Government in the Territories, 153 
MIL. L. REV. 245, 245-46 (1996). 
105  See Neve Gordon & Nicola Perugini, The politics of human shielding: On the resignification of space 
and the constitution of civilians as shields in liberal wars, ENVIRONMENT & PLANNING D: SOCIETY 
AND SPACE (forthcoming). 
106  See, e.g., HCJ 2320/98 El-Amlah v. IDF Commander [1998] IsrSC 52(3) 346, ¶ 2; HCJ 9441/07 Abu 
Matar v. IDF Commander [2007] IsrSC 62(4) 77, ¶ 10. 
107  SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM 196-97 (Dec. 3, 2014), available at 
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2014/images/12/09/sscistudy1.pdf. 
108  See supra text accompanying note 23. 
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connections and similarities between our peoples”.109 A Palestinian student from Gaza fleshed out 
this analogy, recently, in an open letter supporting Native American-led demonstrations:  
 
“When I read your history, I can see myself and my people reflected in yours, 
[…] America’s policy of occupation and displacement […], and the gradual 
transfer of so many of your people to massive, impoverished reservations, hurts 
me deeply because it is so similar to the ethnic cleansing of my ancestors by the 
Israeli military occupation […]. Like you, we don’t control our natural 
resources.”110  
 
Drawing a reverse analogy, Canadian First Nations author Lee Maracle has called Palestinians 
the “Indians of the Middle East”.111 Similarly, following a visit to the West Bank, a member of a 
delegation of U.S. Indigenous and other non-white women depicted the situation there as “a high-
speed and high-tech version of the colonization of our Indigenous homelands”.112 On another 
occasion, one of several Canadian activists, recounting how they had raised the Palestinian and 
Mohawk flags on the same pole in show of solidarity, drew the following analogy: “we would 
[…] think, we are one, and the winds carry our colours together from Jerusalem to the Grand 
River […]. Our struggles are one”.113 A group of Native American academics likewise publicly 
asserted: “Indigenous Peoples’ experience parallels what has happened to the occupied 
Palestinians. [… Both] have suffered through the process of settlement, colonization, or 
militarization of their homelands”.114  
This latter analogy is representative of a recent wave of scholarship analogizing 
Palestinians to North American or Australian Indigenous people, including: a critique of Israeli 
jurisprudence on Palestinian-Bedouin property rights through the legal framework of Australian 
native title jurisprudence;115 a scholarly analogy between the legal regimes dispossessing 
                                                 
109  Quoted in Dana M. Olwan, On Assumptive Solidarity in Comparative Settler Colonialisms, 4 FERAL 
FEMINISMS 89, 89 (2015). 
110  Ben Norton, Palestinians support indigenous Dakota pipeline protests: “We stand with Standing 
Rock”, SALON (Nov. 18, 2016), http://www.salon.com/2016/11/18/palestinians-support-indigenous-
nodapl-protests-we-stand-with-standing-rock/. 
111  Quoted in Mike Krebs & Dana M. Olwan, ‘From Jerusalem to the Grand River, Our Struggles are 
One’: Challenging Canadian and Israeli Settler Colonialism, 2 SETTLER COLONIAL STUD. 138, 142 
(2012). 
112  Waziyatawin, Malice Enough in Their Hearts and Courage Enough in Ours: Reflections on US 
Indigenous and Palestinian Experiences Under Occupation, 2 SETTLER COLONIAL STUD. 172, 172 
(2012). 
113  Quoted in Krebs & Olwan, supra note 111, at 157. 
114  Gale C. Toensing, Indigenous Scholars Oppose Navajo President ‘Becoming Partners’ With Israel, 
INDIAN COUNTRY (June 4, 2013), available at 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/04/06/indigenous-scholars-oppose-navajo-
president-becoming-partners-israel-148645. 
115  John Sheehan, Applying an Australian Native Title Framework to Bedouin Property, in INDIGENOUS 
(IN)JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND BEDOUIN ARABS IN THE NAQAB/NEGEV 229 (Ahmad Amara et 
al. eds., 2012). 
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Palestinians and Native Americans from national resources;116 an analogy between Palestinian 
and Native American poetry;117 and analogies between (primarily literary) discourses surrounding 
Palestinians and Native Americans.118 Another Native American academic and activist pointed 
not only to parallels but also to chronological overlap in “our shared histories […] with 
Palestinian people”, analogizing the Nakba – the mass displacement of Palestinians in 1948 – to 
the “mass relocation of Native [American] people off of tribal lands […] around the [same] 
time”.119  
 Yet, as shown above with regard to Israeli and U.S. legal discourses,120 it is often state 
supporters and allies that resort to analogies of their own, overtly or implicitly countering critical 
analogies such as these. Certain North American Indigenous public figures have thus analogized 
their peoples not to Palestinians but to Israeli Jews.121 Such analogies, however, have garnered 
criticism from other North American Indigenous people, for complicity in what they term 
“redwashing” – Israel’s attempt to fend off international censure by associating itself with 
Indigenous peoples.122 A major bone of contention within this battlefield of analogies is thus the 
question of entitlement to claim Indigenous status in Israel/Palestine.123  
Israeli state officials, lawyers, and soldiers, too, have explained or legitimized their 
actions by means of analogy, though the analogue to Israeli Jews has varied: white settlers in 
some cases, and Indigenous people in others. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon once 
told a U.S. official: “We have learned a lot from you Americans, how you moved West”.124 
Soldiers in the Israeli military’s Golani brigade have long referred to themselves not as settlers 
but as “American Indians”,125 and in 2016 a photograph was published of a soldier wearing a shirt 
with a picture of an Amerindian chief and the text “When […] the Indian [i.e., the Israeli soldier] 
hits, every Arab mother shall cry”.126 A legal advisor to an Israeli municipality, invoking the 
                                                 
116  Annalisa Jabaily, Water Rites: A Comparative Study of the Dispossession of American Indians and 
Palestinians from National Resources, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 225 (2004). 
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Intifada Poetry, 2 NEBULA 34 (2005). 
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119  Nick Estes, A Native American Reflection on the Nakba, THE NAKBA FILES (July 18, 2016), available 
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120  See supra text accompanying notes 104-07. 
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2012), available at http://www.navajo-
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122  Massoud Hayoun, Palestinians, Israelis Occupy Navajo Consciousness, ALJAZEERA AMERICA (Apr. 
28, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/4/28/palestine-israelnavajo.html; Krebs & 
Olwan, supra note 111. 
123  On the place this question occupies in scholarly debates on Israel/Palestine, see, e.g., Oren Yiftachel 
et al., Between rights and denials: Bedouin indigeneity in the Negev/Naqab, ENVIRONMENT & 
PLANNING A (forthcoming). 
124  Quoted in Hadani Ditmars, Palestinians and Canadian natives join hands to protest colonization, 
HAARETZ (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.haaretz.com/news/features/palestinians-and-canadian-natives-
join-hands-to-protest-colonization.premium-1.500057. 
125  See, e.g., AVIHAI BECKER, INDIANS ON HILL 16: A COMPANY IN THE MOUNT HERMON BATTLE (2003) 
(Hebrew). 
126  Ayed Fadel’s Facebook post (Nov. 28, 2016), available at 
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infamous terra nullius doctrine while criticizing the marketing of a land for residential 
development, asserted that the current residents “are not [American] Indians. This is not an empty 
land”.127 On another occasion, the Israeli Supreme Court made reference to U.S. federal legal 
protections for Indigenous burial sites, despite ultimately authorizing construction on Muslim 
cemetery grounds.128 
Contextualized in this light, Palestinians’ analogy-oriented studies in Israeli prison, and 
Israeli authorities’ crackdown on these studies, can be understood not in isolation but as part of a 
broader battleground of analogies regarding Indigenous-settler relations. In this discursive terrain, 
it is the opponents of counter-official analogies themselves who, over and over again, deploy 
analogies invoking settlers and Indigenous people.  
In fact, opposing sides sometimes utilize the exact same analogy. In a 2013 meeting of 
the Israeli parliamentary Interior and Environmental Affairs Committee, for instance, the 
committee chair, dismissing allegations that a bill under discussion would continue the forced 
transfer and dispossession of Palestinian Bedouins, suggested that this would be no worse than 
“what the Americans did to the Indians” – thus making light of Palestinians’ and Native 
Americans’ situations at the same time. To this, a member of an opposition party reprovingly 
responded: “I very rarely agree with you, Madam Chairwoman. Precisely as they did to the 
Indians. Indeed. Israelis and Americans are in the same boat.”129 Also imbued with competing 
meanings has been an analogy to the American “Wild West”: a former Deputy Speaker of the 
Israeli parliament, on the one hand, has applied this analogy to Israel’s allegedly unruly 
Palestinian citizens;130 on the other hand, other Israelis, politicians131 and military veterans,132 
have suggested that it is certain Jewish settlers in the West Bank who are the lawless analog. 
Despite having transformed over time, such historical-geographical analogies are hardly 
new. Throughout the past two centuries, similar analogies have occupied an important place in 
discourses surrounding Israel/Palestine, North America, and Australia – providing a historical 
context for better understanding the analogies examined and introduced by this Article.  
Thus, while some pre-statehood Zionists undertook to distance themselves from 
imperialism,133 others, including prominent activists and thinkers, frequently and unapologetically 
analogized themselves to European settlers in North America or elsewhere. Speaking in the 
United States in 1915, David Ben-Gurion, later Israel’s first prime minister, vowed that Jewish 
settlers in Palestine would “turn the wasteland and desolation into a flourishing […] oasis, as did 
                                                                                                                                                 
https://www.facebook.com/ayed.fadel/posts/10157744812125366. 
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129  Interior & Environmental Affairs Committee, 19th Knesset – Transcript 148, at 27-28 (Dec. 9, 2013) 
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132  Breaking the Silence, Susya is the “wild west” (n.d.), available at 
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the English settlers in North America”.134 Harking back to the “history of American settlement”, 
he extolled the “herculean […] tasks of the colonists who came to find the new Homeland in the 
New World” and their “fierce […] fights […] with wild nature and wilder redskins, the sacrifices 
made before they unlocked the continent for mass influx and colonization”.135 Years later, as 
incumbent prime minister, he urged an audience of American Jews in Israel to consider 
themselves “on the edge of colonization”, in a mission even more difficult than the “conquest of 
the Wild West”.136  
In 1921, Chaim Weizmann, Israel’s future first president, encouraged the members of the 
World Zionist Congress that, unlike the history of “British dominions”, Jews were making 
remarkable achievements in Palestine, especially considering “the inevitable percentage of 
failures which occurs in all colonizing work”.137 Similar analogies appeared in “The Iron Wall”, 
the famous essay by revisionist Zionist leader Vladimir Jabotinsky: 
 
That the Arabs of the Land of Israel should willingly come to an agreement with 
us is beyond all hopes […. Those] “great explorers,” the English, Scots and 
Dutch who were the first real pioneers of North America […] not only wished to 
leave the redskins at peace but could also pity a fly […]. But the native resisted 
both barbarian and civilized settler with the same degree of cruelty. [… There] 
has never been an indigenous inhabitant anywhere or at any time who has ever 
accepted the settlement of others in his country. […] And so it is for the Arabs. 
[…] They look upon Palestine with the same instinctive love and true fervor that 
any Aztec looked upon his Mexico or any Sioux looked upon his prairie.138 
 
Conversely, in the United States, the Indigenous population has long been analogized to 
Palestine’s Arabs. Nineteenth-century landscape paintings in the Southwest frequently featured 
Native Americans in clothing and scenery akin to those of Bedouin Arabs, and one of the era’s 
travel authors expressed astonishment at how Palestine’s “Arabs can hear and recognize each 
other’s voices” using “distinctive cries, corresponding to the whoops of our Indians”.139 
Twentieth-century U.S. tourist guides and travelogues romanticized Palestinians, particularly 
Bedouins, as omnipotent Amerindian chiefs, with one 1955 guide describing a Bedouin 
encampment as “Israel’s ‘Red Indian Reserve’” and a Jewish Kibbutz as having “features of a 
                                                 
134  DAVID BEN-GURION, Parashat Drakhim [Parting of Ways], MI-MAAMAD LE-AM 13-14 (FROM A 
CLASS TO A NATION) (1974) (1915) (Hebrew), available at 
http://benyehuda.org/ben_gurion/class02.html. 
135  Quoted in Naseer H. Aruri, Human Rights and the Israeli Occupation of Palestine, in THE 
INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE – 2ND U.N. SEMINAR ON THE QUESTION OF 
PALESTINE 200 (1980), available at 
https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7057B228AE31A9E9852574C9004EE90D. 
136  Quoted in SHIRA ROBINSON, CITIZEN STRANGERS: PALESTINIANS AND THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL’S 
LIBERAL SETTLER STATE 54 (2013). 
137  Quoted id. 
138  VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY, THE IRON WALL (1923), available at 
http://www.marxists.de/middleast/ironwall/ironwall.htm. 
139  Alex Lubin, “We are all Israelis”: The Politics of Colonial Comparisons, 107 S. ATLANTIC Q. 671, 
675-77 (2008). 
Forthcoming] Ties of Separation 23 
 
 
23 
 
Texan frontier post”.140 
 Related analogies appeared outside the United States and Israel/Palestine as well. In 
1937, Winston Churchill, the United Kingdom’s would-be prime minister, publicly analogized 
Palestinians to a dog in the manger,  
 
[with no] final right to the manger, even though he may have lain there for a long 
time. I do not admit that right. I do not admit, for instance, that a great wrong has 
been done to the Red Indians of America, or the black [i.e., Aboriginal] people of 
Australia […] by the fact that […] a higher grade race […] has come in and taken 
their place.141 
 
A few years later, while serving on the government-appointed Anglo-American Committee of 
Inquiry into the Problems of European Jewry and Palestine, British Labour Member of 
Parliament Richard Crossman similarly analogized Zionism to the way “the American settler 
developed the West”, and Palestine’s Arabs to “the aboriginal who must go down before the 
march of progress”.142 
As this two-century long discursive tapestry indicates, analogies are already ubiquitous. 
Indeed, analogy is a key mode of acting, thinking, and communicating,143 central to law144 and 
politics.145 Some, such as essayist and poet Ralph Waldo Emerson and philosopher Friedrich 
Nietzsche, have gone as far as asserting, respectively, that “[a]ll thinking is analogising”,146 and 
that “[e]very concept arises from the equation of unequal things”.147  
This near-unavoidability of analogies carries at least two implications. First, that 
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analogies such as those offered by this Article – or by the Israeli Open University coursebook, or 
by other scholarly sources cited above – are best understood not as external observations removed 
from their object of inquiry, but as part and parcel of an already analogy-laden discourse. A 
second implication is that a critical inquiry is needed not (only) into whether to utilize such 
analogies, but rather into how analogies operate, can operate, and are prevented from operating, 
and what they facilitate or obstruct within specific settings and framings. Having explored this 
point in the specific context of analogies concerning Indigenous-settler relations in 
Israel/Palestine, North America, and Australia, I now turn to tackling it from a broader conceptual 
perspective. 
 
III.  ANALOGY’S FRAMEWORKS 
 
Having put forward the generational segregation analogy in Part I, and having then 
contextualized it against analogies concerning settler-Indigenous relations in Part II, I now turn to 
investigating analogy at a broader conceptual level, in the present context and beyond. At the 
center of inquiry will be the relationship between analogy and framing – a relationship existing 
on at least two levels. First, debates about the value and aptness of any given historical-
geographical analogy are framed in certain ways, resting on particular assumptions about the 
meaning and nature of the concept “analogy”. And second, such analogies themselves are 
conceptual, interpretive, and narrative frameworks, delimited and constrained by specific 
geographical and historical demarcations. As is the case with all frameworks,148 each of these 
levels of framing simultaneously (albeit never fully) excludes and includes, opens up and hinders, 
entrenches and silences. Below, I ruminate over these two levels of framing, thereby self-
reflexively considering my own method – analogy. In so doing, I seek to think not only with but 
also beyond, or even against, historical-geographical analogies. 
More specifically, the discussion that follows problematizes three pertinent framings of 
analogies: legalistic analogies relating to generational segregation, in which the broader field of 
child law and policy remains uncontested; rigid conceptualizations of “(settler) colonialism” in 
analogies between North America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine; and a tendency, widespread in 
debates on the (settler-)colonial analogy as well as on other historical-geographical analogies, to 
reduce analogy to similarity. This conceptual analysis aims to contribute to more nuanced and 
self-reflexive usage of, and thinking about, analogies such as those under examination.  
Moreover, by placing generational segregation within the specific contexts of child law 
and policy and (settler) colonialism, I hope to throw light on both its idiosyncrasies and its 
commonalities with each of these contexts: to bring out, on the one hand, some of the connections 
and parallels generational segregation shares with other child-related or settler-colonial practices; 
and to highlight, on the other hand, its specificity – vis-à-vis settler-colonial practices less directly 
centered around child-adult relations as well as child-focused interventions less intertwined with 
settler colonialism. 
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A.  Legalistic Analogies Concerning Generational Segregation 
 
The generational segregation analogy, as advanced in Part I, can shed new light on child-
related discourses and practices, past and present. But in singling out generational segregation in 
North America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine, this analogy might also be misunderstood to 
regard these as dark chapters in an otherwise benign history, or field, of child law and policy.149 
This pitfall is evident in scholarly assertions such as that Indigenous child removal was “in 
violation of children’s rights as defined by […] the United Nations […], including […] the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child”.150 Formulating their criticism of generational segregation 
in the sort of legalistic or liberal rule-of-law151 terms that dominate child-centered 
jurisprudence,152 such commentators might reproduce an insufficiently critical stance toward a 
socio-legal field deserving of much greater suspicion.  
What such a legalistic approach overlooks is that generational segregation in North 
America, Australia, or Israel/Palestine – notwithstanding its undeniable specificities – typifies 
rather than deviates from child law and policy, in more ways than one. In its modern form, this 
legal-political field developed, in part, as a means to remove poor and working-class children and 
civilize them away from their allegedly depraved or unfit parents, often in the name of national 
interests.153 Separation was seen as necessary, because without it parental influences would have 
undermined and potentially undo the children’s moral instruction.154 As a growing body of 
literature has explained, child-related interventions throughout modern times – whether iterated 
as “child saving”, “child welfare”, “children’s rights”, or “juvenile justice” – have all too often 
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social change. CHRIS HUTTON, LANGUAGE, MEANING AND THE LAW 13-15 (2009). For alternative 
conceptions of law, see, e.g., WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in SELECTED WRITINGS VOL. 
1: 1913-1926, at 236 (Marcus Bullock & Michael W. Jennings eds., Lloyd Spencer et al. trans. 1996); 
PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 
33-56 (1998); David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers. 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990). 
152  On the legalism of this jurisprudence, see Annette Ruth Appell, The Pre-Political Child of Child-
Centered Jurisprudence, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 703, 726 (2009). 
153  ERIC HOPKINS, CHILDHOOD TRANSFORMED: WORKING-CLASS CHILDREN IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
ENGLAND (1994); MAY ET AL., supra note 74, at 109-11; LYDIA MURDOCH, IMAGINED ORPHANS: 
POOR FAMILIES, CHILD WELFARE, AND CONTESTED CITIZENSHIP IN LONDON (2006); ANTHONY M. 
PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2nd edn., 1977); John Clarke, The 
three Rs - repression, rescue and rehabilitation: ideologies of control for working class youth, in 
YOUTH JUSTICE: CRITICAL READINGS 115 (John Muncie et al. eds., 2002); Swain 2016, supra note 52, 
at 195. 
154  MAY ET AL., supra note 74, at 107-08. 
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worked to children’s detriment, unwittingly or not.155 To date, disadvantaged socio-economic, 
racial, and ethnic groups continue to be ill-served and disproportionately targeted.156 And, 
notwithstanding undeniable transformations, contemporary child law still enshrines principles 
akin to some of those invoked in justification of generational segregation (as discussed above),157 
such as separation, “best interests”, and “rehabilitation”.158 
At a more fundamental level, the socio-legal category “child”, in its modern iterations, is 
premised on, and reinforces, the same essentialism undergirding generational separation: the 
assumption that all those classified as “children” are one and the same, sharing relatively similar 
traits (such as plasticity) and needs (such as special tr). In the main, this notion effaces the 
culturally and historically contingent nature of the construct “childhood”, the infinite disparity 
among “children”, their weighty commonalities with “adults”, and the social forces invested in 
reproducing the seemingly natural child/adult divide. While exceeding the scope of this Article, 
                                                 
155  See, e.g., Ashleigh Barnes, A Genealogy of the CRC, 23 MINN. J. INT’L L. 101 (2014); Karl Hanson, 
Separate Childhood Laws and the Future of Society, 12 L., CULTURE & HUMAN. 195 (2016); Marlee 
Kline, Child Welfare Law, “Best Interests of the Child” Ideology, and First Nations, 30 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J. 375 (1992); Daniel Monk, Childhood and the law: In whose ‘best interests’?, in AN 
INTRODUCTION TO CHILDHOOD STUDIES 177 (Mary Jane Kehily ed., 2nd edn., 2009); Wendy 
Stainton-Rogers, Promoting better childhoods: constructions of child concern, in AN INTRODUCTION 
TO CHILDHOOD STUDIES 101 (Mary Jane Kehily ed., 3rd edn., 2015); Zvi H. Triger, The Child’s Worst 
Interests: Socio-Legal Taboos on Same-Sex Parenting and Their Impact on Children’s Well-Being, 28 
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156  See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 
(1999); OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN 
AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE (Darnell Felix Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf Leonard eds., 2005); 
CLAYTON A. HARTJEN, YOUTH, CRIME, AND JUSTICE: A GLOBAL INQUIRY (2008); Barnes, supra note 
155 (arguing that the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child rests on a vision of childhood that 
marginalizes, excludes, and stigmatizes particular children). Conflicting explanations have been 
offered of the disproportionality issue – see, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality 
Movement in Child Welfare: False Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871 (2009); 
Alan J. Dettlaff et al., Disentangling substantiation: The influence of race, income, and risk on the 
substantiation decision in child welfare, 33 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 1630 (2011); Vandna 
Sinha et al., Substantiating neglect of first nations and non-aboriginal children, 35 CHILD. & YOUTH 
SERVICES REV. 2080 (2013). 
157  See supra text accompanying notes 51-54. 
158  See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, 44 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 49, 
U.N. Doc. A/44/49, (1989), Arts. 3, 37(c); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. 
Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), Arts. 10.2.(b), 10.3, 
14(4); United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (“Beijing 
Rules”), G.A. Res. 40/33, Annex, 40 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/40/53/Annex (1985), 
Arts. 1.1, 5.1, 13.4, 14.2, 17.1(d), 24.1, 26.3; U.N. Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of 
their Liberty (“Havana Rules”), G.A. Res. 45/113, Annex, 45 U.N. GAPR, Supp. No. 49A, U.N. Doc. 
A/45/49/Annex (1990), Arts. 2, 27, 29, 32, Annex – Arts. 1, 28; U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Treatment of Prisoners (“Mandela Rules”), G.A. Res. 70/175, U.N. Doc. A/RES/70/175 (2015), 
Arts. 4, 11, 88, 91-94, 96, 98, 104, 112. 
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this taken-for-granted essentialism has been criticized and deconstructed elsewhere,159 even if 
legalistic writing largely overlooks these critical insights.160 It is in order to call into question 
these supposedly self-evident and benevolent orderings and conceptions of childhood and 
adulthood – as well as to highlight the importance of generation as a social-political unit161 – that 
I have chosen to use the potentially explosive phrase “generational segregation”.162 
Given all of this, it should not come as a complete surprise that the history of child law 
and policy is ridden with ample examples, beyond the four focused on here, of both generational 
segregation and attempts at re-educating Indigenous or ethnic minority children.163 Among these, 
in Switzerland, over a period spanning half a century up to the mid-1970s, hundreds of children 
of Yenish origin (often described as “gypsies” or “gypsy-like”) were removed from their birth 
families, forcefully and systematically, and placed with foster families or in institutions, in an 
effort to assimilate them into dominant society.164 During French colonial rule in Morocco, 
“mixed-race” children were likewise transferred from their purportedly unfit mothers to 
                                                 
159  See, e.g., AN INTRODUCTION TO CHILDHOOD STUDIES 2015, supra note 155; ERICA BURMAN, 
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Peter Kelly, The brain in the jar: a critique of discourses of adolescent brain development, 15 J. 
YOUTH STUD. 944 (2012). 
160  See, e.g., SONIA HARRIS-SHORT, ABORIGINAL CHILD WELFARE, SELF-GOVERNMENT AND THE RIGHTS 
OF INDIGENOUS CHILDREN: PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 290 (2012) 
(extolling the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child for its “commitment to […] universal 
standards” and arguing that, despite containing provisions regarded unfavorably by Indigenous 
communities, the Convention provides an “inclusive starting point” for protecting Indigenous 
children’s “fundamental rights and interests”). 
161  On generation generally, see, e.g., SHMUEL N. EISENSTADT, FROM GENERATION TO GENERATION (3rd 
edn, 2009); Karl Mannheim, The Problem of Generations, 57 PSYCHOANALYTIC REV. 378 (1990). On 
the relationship between generation and childhood, see, e.g., CHILDHOOD IN GENERATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE (Berry Mayall & Helga Zeiher eds., 2003); Robert M. Vanderbeck, Intergenerational 
Geographies: Age-Relations, Segregation and Re-engagements, 1 GEOGRAPHY COMPASS 200 (2007). 
On the meaning and importance of generation in the Israeli-Palestinian context, see COLLINS, supra 
note 23, at 11-21. 
162  For other uses of this or similar terminology, see HOWARD P. CHUDACOFF, HOW OLD ARE YOU: AGE 
CONSCIOUSNESS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1989); Vanderbeck, supra note 161.  
163  Needless to say, the parallels and divergence across or within these and other policies and practices 
are endlessly complex, and so are the parallels and divergence between them and the four contexts 
discussed earlier in this Article. On some of the former parallels and divergence, see ANDREA SMITH, 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND BOARDING SCHOOLS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Secretariat of the UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 2009), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/E_C_19_2009_crp1.pdf; on some of the latter, see 
JACOBS, supra note 44. The aim here is not to delve into these, but to draw critical insights from this 
broader, and in some respects ongoing (hi)story.  
164  Thomas Meier, The fight against the Swiss Yenish and the ‘Children of the open road’ campaign, 18 
ROMANI STUD. 101 (2008). 
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orphanages,165 while in the Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia) child protection agencies 
endeavored “to remove [such children …] as early as possible from the influence of native […] 
mothers”.166 In the Ottoman Empire, between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, boys were 
taken from rural Christian families in the Balkans, converted to Islam, and conscripted into 
military or civil service.167  
In addition, laws and policies encouraging the assimilation or “civilization”, through 
boarding schools, of Indigenous or ethnic minority children were put in place across the globe: 
from Latin America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, through colonial Sierra Leone in 
the nineteenth century and New Zealand in its early days, to the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 
certain provinces in China from 1949 into the 1980s.168 Generational segregation was also 
imposed on groups other than Indigenous peoples or ethnic minorities. For instance, for nearly 
half a century until the 1990s, thousands of Spanish parents, deemed either politically dangerous 
or morally/economically deficient, are believed to have had their babies taken away and placed 
with “approved” families.169  
Even North America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine, specifically, each have wider 
histories of generational segregation and subjugation through education. Among other things, in 
North America and Australia alike, there were other removals, some preceding the ones on which 
this Article focuses, including removals of Indigenous children in the pre-boarding-school era as 
well as removals of children from poor or working-class families.170 As a case in point, for nearly 
eight decades up to 1929, legally-authorized charities in the United States transferred an 
estimated 200,000 to 250,000 children – mostly from impoverished immigrant families who 
sometimes later had to file lawsuits reclaiming them – for indenture or adoption in faraway parts 
                                                 
165  OWEN WHITE, CHILDREN OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE: MISCEGENATION AND COLONIAL SOCIETY IN 
FRENCH WEST AFRICA 1895-1960, at 55-60 (1999). 
166  Quoted in ANN LAURA STOLER, CARNAL KNOWLEDGE AND IMPERIAL POWER: RACE AND THE 
INTIMATE IN COLONIAL RULE 121 (2002). 
167  Gulay Yilmaz, Becoming a Devşirme: The Training of Conscripted Children in the Ottoman Empire, 
in CHILDREN IN SLAVERY THROUGH THE AGES 119 (Gwyn Campbell et al. eds., 2009). 
168  SMITH, supra note 163. See also MICHAEL C. COLEMAN, AMERICAN INDIANS, THE IRISH, AND 
GOVERNMENT SCHOOLING (2009) (comparatively examining the assimilative schooling of Indigenous 
children in the United States and Irish children under British rule).  
169  Katya Adler, Spain’s stolen babies and the families who lived a lie, BBC NEWS (Oct. 18, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-15335899. Apartheid South Africa witnessed a triangle of 
incarceration, “rehabilitation”, and education – partly comparable to the situations in Israel/Palestine, 
North America, and Australia but with an important difference: the absence of generational 
segregation. Thus, before their release from detention, some black children were sent to so-called 
“rehabilitation camps” and “re-education centers”, where they were reportedly abused by the security 
forces. AMNESTY INT’L, 1987 REPORT 101 (1987), available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL1000021987ENGLISH.PDF; G.A. Res. 43/134 
(Dec. 8, 1988), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r134.htm. On the non-
separation of the thousands of children held under South Africa’s emergency regulations at the time, 
and on the poorly enforced separation of young black inmates otherwise, see, respectively, Enid 
Fourie, The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Crisis for Children in South Africa: 
Apartheid and Detention, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 106, 111 (1990); FIONA MCLACHLAN, CHILDREN IN 
PRISON: SOUTH AFRICA (1985), available at 
http://psimg.jstor.org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.nuun1985_02_final.pdf. 
170  JACOBS, supra note 44. 
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of the country.171 Some scholars of North America have also observed parallels between boarding 
schools for Indigenous children, contemporaneous industrial and correctional schools for lower-
class white children,172 and earlier forms of assimilative schooling.173  
In Palestine, English missionaries during Ottoman and British rule endeavored to convert 
local children to Christianity through removal and education.174 International Jewish 
organizations operating in North Africa in the 1940s and 1950s viewed local Jewish parents as 
incorrigibly degenerate, made efforts to separate them from their children, and arranged for some 
children to be put up for adoption.175 In 1950s Israel, non-European Jewish immigrants, primarily 
of Yemenite origin – whom earlier Zionists described as inferior “Arab hybrids”176 – reputedly 
had hundreds or even thousands of their babies abducted for adoption.177 In addition, Palestinian 
citizen children in Israel, whose school system is separate from the Jewish one, are required to 
learn about Jewish values and culture, while their curriculum excludes expressions of Palestinian 
nationalism and other possible challenges to dominant Zionist narratives.178 
Moreover, isolating the four referents of the generational segregation analogy from this 
global context also overlooks the transnational nature of such segregation. Certain forms of 
generational segregation, such as large-scale child emigration, transnational adoption, and child 
evacuation schemes and initiatives, are by definition transnational. Here, too, examples abound. 
For about a century beginning in the late 1860s – a “shameful episode of history”, as British 
prime minister Gordon Brown would later describe it – government-funded charities dispatched 
tens of thousands of British children (between 80,000 and 150,000 according to different 
estimates) to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Southern Rhodesia (today’s Zimbabwe). Most 
of the children were from poor, primarily working-class households, and many of them have 
since spoken of the suffering caused by their removal and, in some cases, their subsequent abuse 
                                                 
171  Rebecca S. Trammell, Orphan Train Myths and Legal Reality, 5 MOD. AM. 3 (2009). 
172  MILLOY, supra note 4. 
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174  NANCY L. STOCKDALE, COLONIAL ENCOUNTERS AMONG ENGLISH AND PALESTINIAN WOMEN, 1800-
1948, at 115-19, 137-38, 149, 156-57 (2007). 
175  Benny Nurieli, The Children Must Be Saved: OSE and the Jews of North Africa, in ZIONISM AND 
EMPIRES 269 (Yehouda Shenhav ed., 2015) (Hebrew). 
176  Id., at 273. 
177  SHOSHANA MADMONI-GERBER, ISRAELI MEDIA AND THE FRAMING OF INTERNAL CONFLICT: THE 
YEMENITE BABIES AFFAIR (2009); Ruth Amir, Transitional Justice Accountability and 
Memorialisation: The Yemeni Children Affair and the Indian Residential Schools, 47 ISR. L. REV. 3, 
7-12 (2014). For a comparative discussion of the Yemenite children affair and Canada’s Indian 
Residential Schools, see Amir, supra, at 4, 20, 24-26. The Israeli government recently ordered the 
declassification of some 200,000 files relating to the missing children. Yet, many other, potentially 
damning state records were burned or lost many years ago, and many other files remain out of public 
reach. Jonathan Cook, Israel urged to apologise for disappeared babies, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 2, 2017), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/01/israel-urged-apologise-disappeared-babies-
170101134501812.html; Haokets, Israel opens files on disappeared Yemenite children. But is it 
enough?, +972 MAGAZINE (Jan. 2, 2017), available at https://972mag.com/state-opens-files-on-
disappeared-yemenite-children-but-is-it-enough/124088/. 
178  Ismael Abu-Saad, State educational policy and curriculum: The case of Palestinian Arabs in Israel, 7 
INT’L EDUC. J. 709 (2006); Hedi Viterbo, Guarantees of Collectivity: Israeli Education Law and the 
Erasure of Palestinian History, 7 TEL AVIV U. INTERDISC. J. 44 (2005) (Hebrew). 
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or neglect.179  
Irish babies labelled as “illegitimate”, too, were sent in their thousands for adoption 
overseas between the early 1940s and mid-1960s, mostly to the United States, sometimes without 
their mothers’ consent.180 From 1963 to 1982, French authorities in the Indian Ocean island of 
Réunion forcibly sent 1,615 children of poor and illiterate parents to France, to work on farms or 
as servants to bourgeois families.181 Like all of these, mass child evacuations in perceived welfare 
emergencies overseas have also drawn criticism. The largest such evacuation, “Operation 
Babylift” – the airlifting of over 2,500 Vietnamese children to the United States and other 
countries in 1975 – was criticized for “kidnapping” children who could have been better off 
remaining in their homeland.182  
The transnational character of generational segregation also manifests itself in 
interconnections between the Indigenous child removal and re-education policies of the United 
States, Canada, and Australia. In the late 1870s, Canadian Prime Minister John MacDonald 
commissioned Nicholas Davin to examine the use of residential schools for Indigenous children 
in the United States. Following meetings with senior U.S. officials and visits to some of these 
schools, Davin’s highly influential report strongly recommended emulating the neighboring 
country’s model.183 Subsequent visits by Canadian officials to the United States, which continued 
until as late as the 1970s, further suggested adopting key elements of the schooling of Indigenous 
children across the border. On occasion, U.S. and Canadian officials also exchanged ideas about, 
and teaching materials for, Indigenous boarding schools, and school staff drew upon the other 
country’s schools when negotiating with government authorities.184 In Australia, institutions for 
Indigenous children were managed by the same umbrella churches as in Canada.185  
                                                 
179  See, e.g., ELLEN BOUCHER, EMPIRE’S CHILDREN: CHILD EMIGRATION, WELFARE, AND THE DECLINE 
OF THE BRITISH WORLD, 1869-1967, at 3-4 (2014); ROGER KERSHAW & JANET SACKS, NEW LIVES 
FOR OLD: THE STORY OF BRITAIN’S CHILD MIGRANTS (2008). 
180  Moira J. Maguire, Foreign Adoptions and the Evolution of Irish Adoption Policy, 1945-52, 36 J. SOC. 
HIST. 387 (2002). 
181  Anne Penketh, France faces up to scandal of Réunion’s stolen children, GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/16/france-reunion-stolen-children. 
182  Kathleen J. S. Bergquist, Operation Babylift or Babyabduction?: Implications of the Hague 
Convention on the humanitarian evacuation and ‘rescue’ of children, 52 INT’L SOC. WORK 621 
(2009). 
183  MILLOY, supra note 4; Woolford & Gacek, supra note 92. 
184  WOOLFORD, supra note 44, at 71, 78, 90-91, 117-18. 
185  MARY ELLEN TURPEL-LAFOND – REPRESENTATIVE FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH PROVINCE OF BRITISH 
COLUMBIA, ABORIGINAL CHILDREN: HUMAN RIGHTS AS A LENS TO BREAK THE INTERGENERATIONAL 
LEGACY OF RESIDENTIAL SCHOOLS (Submitted to the Truth & Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 
2012), available at 
https://www.rcybc.ca/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/reports_publications/20120701_truthandrecon
ciliationsubmission.pdf. Moreover, cross-country influences and links extended beyond child removal 
and education. In 1886, future U.S. president and then Civil Service Commissioner Theodore 
Roosevelt drew analogies to, and lessons from, Canada’s handling of its “Indian problem”. Quoted in 
WOOLFORD, supra note 44, at 65. Australian officials, too, showed some awareness of policies toward 
Indigenous people on the other side of the Pacific: the Minister of State for Home Affairs, for 
instance, declared in 1929, when discussing a proposal to establish reservations for Aborigines, that 
“the Government would try to exercise control on the lines of the Indian Reservations in the United 
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More recently, former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper remarked, in his 
abovementioned public apology, that the Indian Residential School system “was infamously said 
‘to kill the Indian in the child’”,186 a saying also quoted in the Israeli Open University coursebook 
on genocide187 to which Palestinian prisoners have been denied access. However, while Canadian 
officials charged with “educating” the Indigenous population did indeed frequently voice this 
dictum,188 it actually originated from the United States, where it had been coined by no other than 
the abovementioned Richard Pratt. 
The practices and discourses surrounding Indigenous child removal also traversed 
further, beyond these national boundaries and historical epochs. In North America and Australia 
alike, Indigenous child removal largely had legal and philosophical origins traceable to 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain.189 In Canada, it also drew inspiration from Swiss 
manual labor schools.190 The use of “before” and “after” photographs to show children’s 
supposedly successful transformation, a practice honed by British child rescuers,191 later came to 
be used in boarding schools for Indigenous children in North America,192 as well as in Indigenous 
child removal in Australia.193 At the same time, over in Britain, Native American children were 
being portrayed as inferior and pitiful, while the press and literature reported: “The American and 
Canadian governments are trying hard to make […] wandering [Indian] men into good citizens”; 
“They can do little with the grown-up people, but the children they are trying to send to 
school”.194  
And while street children in Britain were analogized to both “Arabs” and uncivilized 
indigenes,195 the British Mandate government in Palestine, between the 1920s and 1940s, laid the 
                                                                                                                                                 
States and Canada”. Quoted in JACOBS, supra note 44, at 51. There have also been cross-border links, 
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CONTINUUM 507 (2005). 
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44, at 153; Eric Margolis, Looking at discipline, looking at labour: photographic representations of 
Indian boarding schools, 19 VISUAL STUD. 8 (2004). 
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INDIGENOUS MEN IN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA, 1887-1937, at xix (2006); AMY E. 
JACKETT, IMAGINED PORTRAITS: REVIVING FIGURES FROM AUSTRALIA’S PAST 173 (Doctoral Thesis, 
Uni. Tas., 2013), available at http://eprints.utas.edu.au/17665/1/whole-Jackett-thesis.pdf.pdf; JACOBS, 
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195  Id., at 79-81, 98. 
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legal foundations for Israel’s future generational segregation of Palestinians. This included 
introducing to Palestine the youth court system and various related laws,196 as well as an array of 
emergency regulations, many of which currently remain in force.197 In fact, more than sixty years 
before Israel established so-called “military youth courts” as part of the increased generational 
segregation,198 the British emergency regulations were amended to authorize military courts to act 
as juvenile courts.199 It is also from British mandate legislation200 that Israeli law borrowed age 
categories that are still applied (exclusively) to Palestinian child defendants.201 
Against this non-exhaustive backdrop, if analogies concerning generational segregation 
are to fulfill as much of their critical potential as possible, they must have child law and policy 
within their frame of critique, in plain view. This requires overcoming legalistic tendencies and 
the common depiction, explicitly or implicitly, of contexts such as those on which this Article 
centers as exceptions to an otherwise benign legal and political field. Recent scholarship on 
Indigenous child removal,202 as well as studies pointing to parallels and continuities between 
present-day law concerning migrant children and past policies pertaining to Native American 
children,203 represent an effort in this direction, though this conversation is still in its infancy. 
 
B.  Rigid Conceptualizations of (Settler) Colonialism  
in Analogies Between North America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine 
 
Also pertinent to the present context – along with legalistic analogies – are analogies that 
invoke “colonialism” generally, or “settler colonialism” specifically. These concepts often appear 
in academic calls for analogies between the United States, Canada, Australia, and 
Israel/Palestine,204 as well as in three scholarly fields highly relevant to this Article. First, the 
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203  Vinita B. Andrapalliyal, History Repeats Itself: Parallels Between Current-Day Threats to Immigrant 
Parental Rights and Native American Parental Rights in the Twentieth Century, 8 U. MASS. L. REV. 
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abovementioned scholars who develop analogies concerning settler-Indigenous dynamics do so 
while describing these, directly or implicitly, as either settler-colonial205 or settler countries.206 
Second, as shown above, the Israeli Open University coursebook on genocide attaches the terms 
“settler” and “colonial” to, and invites related analogies between, the United States, Israel, and 
Australia.207 And finally, cross-country studies of Indigenous child removal have likewise evoked 
these categories.208 In addition, as discussed in Part II above, these terms have occupied a 
significant place outside academic circles as well, in discourses ranging from present-day inter-
country solidarity campaigns to past political and cultural debates. 
Despite inevitably being open to multiple definitions, interpretations, and applications, 
the terms “colonialism” and “settler colonialism” are often treated as self-explanatory, and their 
meaning for those using them hence remains unarticulated, inexplicit, and unexplored. Two rigid 
conceptualizations of these categories – common in and beyond debates surrounding 
Israel/Palestine, North America, and Australia – warrant critical attention here.  
The first frames these categories as applying to rigid political “units”, or historical 
“epochs”,209 despite more nuanced writing on the subject.210 Though these categories may indeed 
be of more analytical relevance to certain contexts than others, such framing overlooks the traces 
colonialism, seldom fully obeying such geographical or temporal boundaries, is bound to leave 
elsewhere. Further, imagining there to be a distinct or separable colonial order neglects the 
prevalence, within liberal “normalcy”, of attributes some scholars211 associate with colonialism, 
such as a normalized state of exception, or legal indeterminacy, or institutionalized 
discrimination.212 Indeed, as partly shown above, generational segregation and related practices 
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bear links and parallels across times and spaces that may not align themselves with some 
common framings of colonialism. These include, for example, framings that place Switzerland, 
whose child policies were discussed above,213 outside colonialism due to its lack of former 
colonies.214 Moreover, such rigid framings also oversimplify colonialism by simultaneously 
downplaying its ever-mutating nature and overstating its all-encompassing domination of 
“colonial” times and spaces.  
A second rigid framing assesses the (settler) colonialism analogy on the basis of a set of 
supposed similarities to either other settler-colonial instances or some imagined prototype. One 
encounters this approach in definitional controversies, not explicitly over the meaning of (settler) 
colonialism itself, but over what characteristics a certain context must possess in order to qualify 
as either colonial or settler-colonial. Some, for example, consider settler migration from a single 
European country to be such a necessary characteristic and argue that, absent this element, pre-
statehood Zionism was a non-colonial movement,215 whereas others delimit colonialism as 
including various examples – Zionism being only one – of substantial settler populations that 
were not nationals of the metropolitan government.216 Such debates, however, emanate from a 
particular, checklist-like reduction of (settler) colonialism to questions of similarity.  
Other frameworks, in contrast, may open up alternative ways of thinking about and 
through these categories. Instead of rigid boundaries or similarities, settler colonialism can be 
conceptualized around a certain mode of operation. In his widely cited writing on the subject, 
Patrick Wolfe has defined settler colonialism as hallmarked by a “logic of elimination”: namely, 
the attempt to establish and perpetually sustain a colonial society in the expropriated territory by 
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culturally, socially, or physically destroying the Indigenous population.217 Providing a fairly 
flexible definition akin to a Wittgensteinian “family resemblance”,218 Wolfe made sure to point 
out that this settler-colonial mode of operation takes on different forms and strategies, varying 
and potentially evolving over time and space. As he noted, these may include, but are not limited 
to, child removal and other forms of social fragmentation or cultural assimilation, as well as 
displacement, mass killing, demographic control, and geographical renaming.219 
Through this alternative conceptual framework, generational segregation can be placed 
within a broader settler-colonial matrix from which it partly draws its effect and meaning. Like 
generational segregation, related legal and political mechanisms within this matrix target not 
necessarily an individual body or subject but the collective subjugated socio-political body. Some 
of these mechanisms, as noted by Wolfe,220 do so through a combination of segregation and 
fragmentation.  
Examples include Israel’s recruitment and use of Palestinian informants, in and outside 
prison, breeding distrust between Palestinians and thereby potentially weakening their collective 
resistance and solidarity. This particular form of social-political fragmentation has benefitted 
from the increased generational segregation of Palestinians in Israeli custody: denying children 
contact with Palestinian adults – including the adult inmates but also the children’s parents and 
prospective attorneys – makes it easier for the Israeli authorities to recruit them as informants.221 
Another practice, amalgamating segregation and fragmentation with the “rehabilitation” 
discourse, is the separation of Palestinian citizens of Israel who are classified as “security 
prisoners” from their non-citizen Palestinian counterparts: as part of its persistent emphasis on the 
importance of such separation,222 the Israeli Supreme Court, invoking yet again rehabilitation in 
the service of segregation, has warned that interaction between these two Palestinian populations 
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would lead to the opposite of rehabilitation: “anti-rehabilitation”.223 Moreover, the Israeli prison 
authorities have reportedly segregated Palestinian inmates into facilities, wards, and cells on the 
basis of their regions of residence, while also isolating those whose influence is deemed 
especially perilous, such as hunger strikers. All the while, outside prison, in line with what Israeli 
officials have publicly called Israel’s “separation policy”, the Gaza Strip has been cut off from 
the West Bank, while the latter has been steadily parcelled into enclaves.224 The consequent 
restriction of physical movement takes place in tandem with Israel’s restriction of the movement 
of imagination – through analogy-laden studies – between different times and places.  
Social and territorial disintegration was the lot of North American Indigenous people too, 
in and beyond the contexts of child removal and boarding schools. Thus, in 1888, a U.S. official 
described boarding schools as designed to imbue the Indigenous student “with the exalting 
egotism of American civilization, so that he will say ‘I’ instead of ‘We’, and ‘This is mine,’ 
instead of ‘This is ours.’”225 Richard Pratt set the Indigenous prisoners on whom he experimented 
with rehabilitation226 against one another by having them guard, scout out, and punish each other. 
Later, Pratt likewise had students in his boarding school punished severely by courts-martial 
made up of their peers.227 Further fragmenting Indigenous communities were the U.S. General 
Allotment Act of 1887 and subsequent amendments, which broke up their lands into small 
individually-owned parcels. Similar measures were imposed on Canada’s Indigenous population, 
albeit without such legislative basis.228 
Counterinsurgency and “national security”, themes discussed above regarding 
generational segregation,229 can also be associated with settler colonialism as part of the 
contextualization this conceptual framework provides.230 Like the treatment of Palestinians by 
dominant Israeli Jewish society,231 albeit to a different degree, Canada and the United States have 
time and again considered their Indigenous populations a “national security” threat. The U.S. 
Bureau of Indian Affairs – a federal agency in the Department of the Interior – was originally 
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located within the War Department, and was run with assistance from military commanders.232 
More recently, lawyers in the Bush administration analogized nineteenth-century Native 
American tribes to present-day terrorists, and this analogy was later reiterated by both the Obama 
administration and the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review.233 Canada’s Senate Special 
Committee on Terrorism and Public Safety warned, in the late 1980s, that Indigenous protests 
and demands for autonomy and compensation in North America would result in domestic 
terrorism.234 And in recent years, Canadian state agencies have classified Indigenous protests over 
lands and resources as an “extremist” threat to national security, while also placing protestors 
under heightened surveillance.235 
Despite foregrounding such important phenomena, no conceptualization of “colonialism” 
or “settler colonialism” can escape the potential exclusions and blind spots of these categories. At 
the same time, similar exclusions are inherent to all interpretive frameworks (including, in the 
present context, the category “childhood”). Therefore, while it is crucial to problematize the 
concepts “colonialism” and “settler colonialism”, singling them out would be both analytically 
naïve and politically questionable. To maintain as much of their critical potential as possible, all 
categories and analogies bar none must be deployed provisionally, with relentless suspicion 
toward their frames and their often-invisible exclusions, in order to prevent them, as much as 
possible, from unwittingly stifling critical thinking and action. 
 
C.  The Reduction of Analogy to Similarity 
 
The similarity-centered framing of the colonialism analogy, discussed above, represents a 
broader tendency, characteristic of public and academic debates, to assess analogies primarily on 
the basis of whether their referents evince “sufficient similarity”. This prevalent reduction of 
analogy to similarity, however, can be called into question on at least three counts, which each 
warrant an alternative discursive framework such as the one I have sought to provide above – an 
alternative framework that would evaluate analogies not (only) on the complicated grounds of 
similarity, but in view of what can be gained or lost by deploying them. 
First, though “analogy”, like all terms, offers itself to a variety of definitions (none of 
which is “truer” than others), believers in conceptual distinctions may nonetheless treat it as 
distinguishable from other, related concepts.236 In this line of thinking, if “equation” can be 
crudely defined as suggesting sameness; “comparison” as either pointing to or assessing 
similarity; and “juxtaposition” as either highlighting contrasts or inviting comparison; then what 
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may set “analogy” apart is its presumption of difference between its referents. This is the 
difference analogy seeks to transcend, but not to deny, as it discerns sameness. In large part, then, 
it is this premise of analogy – the assumption that the parallels in question lie in otherwise 
dissimilar sites – which renders historical-geographical analogies as stimulating and contentious 
as they tend to be. Thus conceptualized, analogy is predicated on and designed to see beyond 
both difference and sameness: it presupposes difference, likens across this difference, but all the 
while acknowledges and leaves difference in place. 
If this conceptual distinction is adopted – provisionally and strategically – then in 
denoting both similarity and difference, historical-geographical analogies can be seen as 
potentially serving two functions at once. On the one hand, by suggesting commonality between 
seemingly unparalleled social settings,237 counter-dominant analogies can challenge a political 
entity’s self-image – be it, for example, a sense of national exceptionalism,238 or a country’s self-
affiliation with certain political configurations and self-distancing from others.239 On the other 
hand, by simultaneously acknowledging the inevitably infinite particularity of each of its 
referents, an analogy can destabilize simplistic characterizations of phenomena as either 
exemplary or exceptional. In this and other regards, though it may seem to aspire to 
generalization, analogical reasoning can already be specific. 
Moreover, in the process of designating certain themes as similar, such analogies can also 
indicate their varying manifestations and uses, even where the aim is not to provide a systematic 
comparative analysis. Indeed, the generational segregation analogy established in this Article can 
point to significant variations, three of which have already become evident in some of the above 
quotes. First, Israeli advocates of generational segregation lack the assimilationist rhetoric of their 
North American and Australian counterparts,240 even if in some other contexts the desire for 
ethnic purity has not been exclusive to Israel/Palestine,241 and despite a few exceptional 
examples, elsewhere, of Zionist assimilationism.242 Second, for the most part, Australia’s focus 
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was on “breeding out the colour” of mixed-race children, whereas in the other three countries the 
primary concern has generally been with social rather than biological influences.243 And third, the 
objectives of generational segregation as concerns the adults from whom the children were 
removed in North America (preemptive counterinsurgency) were different from those in 
Israel/Palestine (legitimizing the curtailment of rights). 
The generational segregation analogy intimates myriad other differences. One of these is 
that the Israeli legal system, though preoccupied with the physical appearance of Palestinian child 
detainees in other circumstances,244 has shown none of the interest of either North American or 
Australian authorities in the clothing and physicality of the separated children.245 There is also 
important disparity in the scope and length of generational segregation. Among other things, in 
Australia, such separation was generally meant to be permanent, while being temporary in the 
other countries; Australian authorities typically sought to prevent all contact between the 
segregated children and their families, whereas elsewhere such contact was normally allowed, 
albeit to considerably varying degrees; and the Palestinian children in Israeli custody are usually 
older, and are separated for shorter periods,246 than their North American – and even more so 
their Australian – counterparts.247 In addition, in North America and Australia alike, the policies, 
practices, rationalizations, and scope of generational segregation varied from one region or state 
to another, and changed over time.248 The further the generational segregation analogy is pursued, 
the more such disparities may come to the fore. 
A second challenge to the prevalent notion that “insufficiently similar” referents defy 
analogy has to do, more fundamentally, with the bilateral relationship between analogy and 
resemblance. Being the conceptual frameworks that they are, analogies do not simply identify 
pre-existing parallels. Instead, they are among the conceptual frameworks that inform whether, 
and to what extent, phenomena are deemed alike in the first place. To become visible, legible, 
and meaningful, similarity and dissimilarity partly depend, then, on the analogies they are often 
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assumed to precede.249 For example, by tying separation to incarceration and “national 
security”,250 the generational segregation analogy not simply captures but may actually alter the 
extent to which Palestinian children’s separation in Israeli custody is perceived as similar to that 
of their Indigenous counterparts in North America and Australia. Accordingly, the more an 
analogy dominates a discursive field, the more it can make certain “parallels” or “differences” 
appear self-evident, while potentially obscuring or discounting alternative analogies – alternative 
structurings of similitude and disparity. If violence can be broadly defined as the preclusion of 
possibilities and potentialities,251 then, in these and other respects, analogy and violence seem 
inextricable from one another: both deploying and avoiding an analogy mean potentially 
excluding certain ideational frameworks. 
Finally, another risk – which political activism runs when similarity becomes its basis – 
is making commonality a prerequisite for compassion and action, and thereby eroding interest in, 
or sympathy for, the plight of others that either seem unparalleled or possess less visible 
parallels.252 This is an ever-present ethical challenge for solidarity campaigns that revolve around 
inter-group resemblance, such as those analyzed above, in Part II. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has provided three complementary readings of the relationship between 
analogy and generational segregation, sharing a common substantive and methodological point of 
departure: Palestinian prisoners’ engagement, through studies now prohibited by the Israeli 
government and courts, with analogy-based critiques and the issue of Indigenous child removal.  
First, using analogy, the Article has shone a spotlight on heretofore unexamined parallels, 
connections, and continuities between the removal of Indigenous children to boarding schools in 
the United States and Canada, Australia’s Aboriginal “stolen generations”, and the separation of 
Palestinian children and adults in Israeli custody. Across these different contexts, generational 
segregation, while anchored in law and couched in a language of benevolence and legalism, has 
severed these children’s intergenerational ties and exposed them to abuse. Its targets have been 
those on both sides of the generational divide: not only the children concerned, who have been 
deemed highly malleable and hence susceptible to intervention, but also their adult counterparts. 
In North America and Australia generational segregation was thus advocated as a 
counterinsurgency measure against Indigenous adults, while Israeli authorities have invoked the 
presumed irredeemability of the separated Palestinian adults as grounds for retracting their 
entitlements (including the above studies). This, I have shown, is but part of broader connections 
between generational segregation, incarceration, education, and “national security”. Alongside 
the cross-country links generational segregation involved at the time, and its lasting legacies in 
North America and Australia, this analogy thus highlights its re-emergence, so to speak, in the 
form of analogous practices elsewhere, in Israel/Palestine. 
                                                 
249  Cf. BUTLER, supra note 148, at 70-71, 83; Piterberg, supra note 204, at 16-17. 
250  See supra text accompanying notes 89-99. 
251  Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 777, 789 (1982); Johan Galtung, 
Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE RES. 167, 168 (1969). 
252  For a similar argument, see JODI DEAN, SOLIDARITY OF STRANGERS: FEMINISM AFTER IDENTITY 
POLITICS (1996). 
Forthcoming] Ties of Separation 41 
 
 
41 
 
Second, to better contextualize the analogies at the core of this Article – those Palestinian 
prisoners explored and the generational segregation analogy put forward here – I have 
investigated the ubiquity and multiple roles of related analogies in relevant discourses 
surrounding North America, Israel/Palestine, and Australia. Under examination have been 
analogies that, like the analogies in the coursebooks to which Palestinian prisoners have been 
denied access, invoke Indigenous-settler relations. Such analogies have figured prominently in a 
range of sites spanning two centuries: from contemporary scholarly debates to statements, past 
and recent, by political activists, state politicians, soldiers, judges, and lawyers. Across this 
discursive tapestry, opposing sides of the debate have been shown to use historical-geographical 
analogies, occasionally using the very same analogy for conflicting objectives. This, I have 
suggested, indicates that the generational segregation analogy, too, is inevitably open to 
competing interpretations and applications, and should therefore be understood in a more nuanced 
light than is often the case. 
Third, further theorizing analogy, the Article has provided a critical analysis of three 
relevant framings of analogies: legalistic criticisms of generational segregation, which portray it 
as a breach of legal norms; analogies between North America, Israel/Palestine, and Australia that 
rigidly conceptualize “colonialism” or “settler colonialism”; and the tendency – common in and 
beyond the present context – to equate analogy with similarity. Starting with legalistic criticisms, 
I have explained that they portray generational segregations such as those under examination as 
exceptions to an otherwise benign legal field of child law and policy, thus leaving this field and 
its norms uncontested. In so doing, this legalistic framing neglects not only the reliance of 
generational segregation on law, as discussed earlier, but also its resonance with broader 
characteristics of modern child law and policy. As discussed in this Article, countless other child-
focused interventions across the world have worked to children’s detriment, further 
disempowering already disadvantaged groups, while also reproducing the same essentialism 
undergirding generational segregation – the conception of “children” as a distinct and 
fundamentally uniform group. More specifically, North America, Australia, and Israel/Palestine, 
as well as a host of other places, have witnessed additional generational segregations and attempts 
at mass re-education. Moreover, in isolating specific generational segregations from this global 
backdrop, legalistic criticisms neglect the transnational nature of certain forms of such 
segregation, as well as the cross-country movement of related discourses and practices.  
As for analogies that rigidly conceptualize “colonialism” or “settler colonialism” – terms 
whose relevance stems from their prominence in various discourses and analogies discussed in 
this Article, including the coursebooks Israel prevents Palestinian prisoners from reading – I have 
called into question two such rigid conceptualizations in particular. One, demarcating colonialism 
along strict historical, geographical, or political lines, has been argued to have several pitfalls: 
neglecting colonialism’s traces outside these imagined boundaries; downplaying the prevalence 
of supposedly colonial phenomena within liberal “normalcy”; and overlooking colonialism’s 
complex and ever-mutating nature. The other reductively assesses colonialism or settler 
colonialism through a checklist of similarities, be they similarities between different cases or 
between a given case and some presumed prototype. As an alternative to such conceptual rigidity, 
I have suggested that a flexibly defined settler-colonial mode of operation sheds light on 
important political and legal forces that complement, parallel, and inform generational 
segregation. Specifically, I have shown how, like generational segregation, such practices 
fragment subjugated groups and position them as a national security threat.  
Shifting this discussion to a wider conceptual level, I have criticized the widespread 
tendency to equate analogy with similarity, pointing to three perils of this reductive framing: 
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neglecting the possibility of seeing analogy as predicated on difference; disregarding the bilateral 
dynamic whereby an analogy’s referents partly depend on the analogy itself to be considered 
alike in the first place; and risking making commonality a prerequisite for empathy and political 
action.  
Together, these three intertwined perspectives bring into conversation bodies of 
scholarship that have so far remained largely disconnected, dealing with a wide range of topics: 
the use of analogy as both an interpretive and rhetorical device, in law253 and in general;254 
Indigenous child removal in Australia,255 Canada,256 the United States,257 and cross-national or 
comparative studies thereof;258 discourses and practices concerning Palestinian children, and 
Palestinian intergenerational interactions, in Israeli custody;259 the legal and social construction of 
childhood;260 and, finally, colonialism,261 particularly settler colonialism.262 Rather than rehashing 
this literature by attempting to exhaust any of these subjects separately, this Article places them 
within a single framework, in order to canvass their interrelationship holistically.  
This holistic analysis is of both methodological and substantive consequence.263 
Methodologically, it employs analogy both as a mode and an object of inquiry: Part I of this 
Article uses the method of analogy to shed new light on generational segregation, while Parts II 
and III put analogy itself on trial, examining its effects, potential, and pitfalls. This unique 
approach, or method, thus simultaneously brings to light and problematizes previously 
unexamined connections, parallels, and continuities. It foregrounds the political and cultural 
nature of analogies, and is also itself, no less importantly, a statement about method: a statement 
about the need to maintain a critical distance from, and self-reflexivity about, one’s method, and 
also about how methods – such as analogy – are neither separate from nor external to their field 
of inquiry.  
Substantively, this framing brings to the fore two significant links between analogy and 
generational segregation. First, for reasons discussed above,264 analogy can offer Palestinian 
inmates a political space unenclosed by the physical and temporal boundaries of Israeli prison. 
Intergenerational knowledge transfer potentially serves a similar function for these Palestinians, 
as it has done for Indigenous people in North America and Australia. Israel’s restriction of 
analogy-filled studies, and its growing separation of Palestinian child and adult inmates, must 
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therefore be analyzed in conjunction with one another, as two mutually complementary 
developments. Second, both analogy and generational segregation are key cornerstones of 
childhood. Through analogy, the category “childhood” has been extended well beyond those who 
are legally classified as children: not uncommonly, women, non-white groups,265 the elderly,266 
the Global South,267 and others who are formally adults but deemed short of adult faculties, have 
been infantilized – analogized to children. These analogies instigate and mutually rely on 
institutional generational segregation as well as spatial transgression. In modern times, those 
classified as children, and to an extent those who are considered childlike, have been relegated 
away from the “normal” adult sphere, purportedly to shield them from it or it from them. Spatial 
transgressions – such as an unaccompanied adult in the playground, or the joint incarceration of 
children and adults – are seen both as distressing and as requiring stricter separation.268 Given 
their major and interrelated roles with regard to childhood, critiquing each of these – analogy and 
generational segregation – is valuable for thinking critically about the other, as well as about 
childhood. 
This Article has thus sought to harness analogy for innovatively investigating the 
ongoing history of generational segregation, and, at the same time, maintain a critical distance 
from analogy, trace analogy’s political baggage and historical specters, and problematize its 
potential exclusions and blind spots. By shedding new light on generational segregation through 
analogy while critiquing analogies in light of discourses and practices related to such segregation, 
a central aim of this Article has thus been to fundamentally challenge and reinvent the terms and 
frameworks available for thinking about issues at the intersection of generational segregation and 
historical-geographical analogies. 
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